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The United States Air Force today faces the challenge of allocating development 
resources to prepare for future force projection requirements.  In particular, the Air 
Force’s core competency of Global Attack implies a future capability that can quickly 
and successfully deliver combat effects anywhere in the world with impunity.  
Understanding that the future threat environment is dynamic and that continued 
advancements by adversaries will likely degrade the technical superiority of today’s 
weapon systems, the need arises for a planning model to direct development funding to 
areas with the greatest probability of successfully defending the strike vehicle of 2035. 
Examining this problem posed two distinct challenges.  The first was to determine the 
most likely course of Integrated Air Defense System technology through the time period 
of interest--allowing for plausible disruptive technologies that generate orders-of-
magnitude improvement in capability or even change the nature of air defense systems.  
The second challenge was to characterize future adversaries--requiring a broad look at 
political and economic trends as presented in AF 2025, SPACECAST 2020 and other 
relevant future studies.  Based on these studies, threat scenarios were generated from 
technical assessments of emerging technologies and evaluated using the Risk Filtering, 
Ranking and Management (RFRM) technique (Haimes, 2004) to explore the most severe 
threats to a future global strike air vehicle.  The application of RFRM to the problem 
created a coherent threat hierarchy that enables the decision maker to examine anticipated 
hostile systems that may counter key U.S. strengths of stealth, speed, and high altitude 
 iv
operations.  Those threat scenarios were then evaluated using decision trees and 
sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how quantitative tools can be applied to a largely 
qualitative problem. Finally, this research produced an unclassified model of plausible 
scenarios and a variable analysis tool that is useful today, but could also be enhanced by 
the application of current intelligence data and updated technology projections in the 
future.     
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The Air Force is facing the challenge of determining how to best allocate 
budgetary and manpower resources to prepare for the needs of future Air Force “force 
projection” capabilities.  In particular, the Air Force’s core competency of Global Attack 
implies a future strike capability that can quickly and successfully deliver combat effects 
anywhere in the world with impunity.  To that end the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), 
Air Vehicles Directorate, is investigating a wide range of potential Long Range Strike 
options for the United States Air Force (USAF).  The first phase of the AFRL project is 
to explore a mix of systems and subsystems in the context of several developed threat 
scenarios that are expected for the 2025 time frame and beyond.  Understanding that the 
threat environment is dynamic and that new/emerging technologies may degrade/negate 
current areas of US superiority, it is important to develop a model to direct research and 
development funding to areas with the greatest probability of successfully employing US 
strike capability in the future. The purpose of this research then is to develop a future 
decision model that will illuminate the most likely future mission and threat scenarios, 
characterize probable future threats to likely system vulnerabilities, and guide the 
decision makers to select the most useful technologies to pursue. 
1.2. Problem Statement  
The Air Force is already investing personnel and financial resources to develop 
tomorrow’s weapon systems to defend the United States against tomorrow’s adversaries.   
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Without a clear development strategy to guide those efforts, the ability of the US to 
achieve a truly effective global strike capability will be significantly diminished. 
This problem poses two distinct challenges.  The first is to determine the most 
likely course of technology and its likely destination in the 2025 time period.  It is not 
enough to make predictions based on historical data, but analyst must also allow for 
unexpected, disruptive technologies that generate orders-of-magnitude improvement in 
capability or even change the very nature of modern warfare.  The second challenge is to 
characterize the mostly likely adversaries in the 2025 future.  This requires a much 
broader look at the political and economic trends in the world to determine future 
environments.  Will the US still drive the world agenda, or will several peers (or near 
peers) arise to present a political, economic or military challenge?  Will large scale wars 
be prevalent or will regional conflicts, and counter terrorism likely be more common?  
Whatever the future holds, the geography and technology at the disposal of our 
adversaries will largely impact our Research and Development (R&D) choices.  For 
example, if our most likely adversaries are expected to possess the capability to field 
advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADs) then thought must be given to 
advanced countermeasures to protect the strike vehicle.  On the other hand, if our most 
likely adversaries lack indigenous technical expertise to field IADs, then they might 
purchase air defense capability from the commercial market.  Such purchases, if acquired 
and employed in piecemeal fashion (e.g., Man Portable Air Defense Systems) may not 
significantly threaten US global strike vehicles.  Force planners would then be allowed to 
rely on incremental improvements to our current foundation technologies:  namely 
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vehicles that typically operate at speeds, altitudes and stealth levels beyond the reach of 
today’s best IADs. 
The main areas of concern for the developers at AFRL are those capabilities that 
may advance to the point that they nullify, or seriously challenge, the traditional US 
strike vehicle advantages of range, speed and stealth.  These same advantages also tend to 
limit the use of escorts on many missions, so a future system would have to defend itself 
against evolved enemy defenses.  Of particular concern for understanding and modeling 
future threats are the following: 
1. Improved Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) detection and tracking 
capabilities are becoming available worldwide. 
2. Advanced threat missiles with multispectral/imaging seekers are being developed. 
3. High energy lasers are quickly becoming credible weapons. 
4. On board missile seekers are evolving wider off-axis lock capability. 
5. Surface-to-Air Missiles are increasing in their range, speed, maneuverability, and 
maximum altitude. 
The challenge then is to explore likely future threat scenarios to help decision makers 
determine where to focus development efforts for countermeasures.  What technologies 
will threaten the US strengths in the air, and how can the US mitigate the threats through 
the design of an integrated strike vehicle self-defense system? 
1.3. Problem Approach 
The problem with “predicting” the future is that, in an environment with I  
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mperfect information, the future is inherently unpredictable with any accuracy 
over long periods of time.  There are simply too many variables and uncertainties to 
generate a conclusive result.  But it is possible to reasonably posit boundaries of a 
planning space in which to predict multiple likely futures, given clear assumptions and a 
rigorous methodology, and then to actively work to bring about the most favorable of the 
likely alternative futures. 
To develop those threat scenarios, this research will use the structure of the Risk 
Filtering, Ranking and Management (RFRM) technique (Haimes, 2004) to explore the 
most severe threats and vulnerabilities to future Air Force global strike systems.  The 
complete application of RFRM to this problem will involve examining threats from the 
perspective of technical capabilities of current and anticipated hostile forces that may 
counter key capabilities (e.g., stealth, hypersonic speed, etc) expected to be US strengths 
in 2025.  Vulnerabilities will be examined from the perspective of all points in the kill 
chain to determine the unrealized weaknesses of the anticipated capabilities (e.g., radar 
that detects stealth aircraft).  Additionally, since the scenarios are of limited use if not put 
in a relevant context with realistic projections, this study will explore the scenarios within 
the frame work of several alternative futures.   
Of particular use to this effort is the Air Force 2025 Project (Parnell, 1997).  This 
study constructed a value hierarchy for Air Force weapon systems that was presented in 
the context of six possible futures.  Nine years later, it is reasonable to believe that 
strategic documents and facts used for creating the alternative futures may have become 
more coherent since the US has been through two full Quadrennial Defense Reviews, 
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suffered a violent attack on the Homeland (9-11), executed two major combat operations 
(Afghanistan and Iraq), and are currently engaged in a global war on terror.  There are 
also now other examples of military-relevant alternative futures studies to compare with 
the Air Force 2025 model.   
In addition, it will be necessary to examine techniques for projecting the advance 
of current technologies and allowing for the insertion of disruptive technologies as part of 
the development of future threat scenarios.  Since this research is structured to provide a 
methodology, not generate an in depth analysis of technologies, it will require an 
authoritative starting point and guidelines to project future technology threats.  Of 
particularly use in this area is the National Research Council’s report on Avoiding 
Surprise in an Era of Global Technology Advances (NRC, 2005).  Not only does their 
report help to establish an expert vision of relevant technologies (based on CIA 
estimates), but it looks specifically at threats to US airpower in an urban environment.  
Using this document (and others) as a foundation will help to create realistic risk 
scenarios with credible likelihood and consequent variables.  
1.4. Research Scope  
AFRL is tasked with developing an integrated defensive suite that will maximize 
vehicle survivability in a high-threat environment of the future (approximately 2025-
2035).  According to the Air Vehicles Directorate’s project briefing, the first phase of the 
development effort is meant to characterize future threats and create simulations for 
planning.  It is a multi-agency integrated effort that will leverage on-going and upcoming 
technology development efforts to 1) collect or generate future mission and threat 
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scenarios, 2) identify system functional requirements based on future scenarios, 3) collect 
or produce data to characterize future threat system vulnerabilities and defensive system 
capabilities, 4) characterize and evaluate alternative technology solutions for each 
component of the defensive system, 5) perform system-level parametric trade studies to 
identify high pay-off solutions, 6) provide guidance for future technology development, 
and 7) to develop and utilize the simulation environment to demonstrate integrated 
capabilities.   Additional program phases will follow, that will lead to advanced 
modeling, prototyping and fielding of an operational system. 
In support of the Phase I effort, this research will seek to develop a credible, 
scenario-based model to help decision makers devise an R&D strategy to counter the 
most likely future threats to a global strike platform.  The goal is to make the model 
easily adjustable (using MS Excel software) so critical values can be modified as more 
detailed/reliable information becomes available over time. 
1.5. Outline  
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature in the area of future prediction, 
technology trends, use of scenarios for decision making, and introduces the RFRM 
process.  In Chapter 3, RFRM is used to develop decision-making scenarios, and 
establish the future decision space. Chapter 4 applies the methodology to match likely 
future threats to R&D of key technologies to counter those threats.  Finally, Chapter 5 
reviews the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the Chapter 4 analysis. 
2. Literature Review 
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2.1. Using Scenarios for Decision Analysis  
While not in abundance, there are relevant examples of using future projections, 
along with decision analysis techniques, to help guide decision makers with strategic 
planning.  However, past efforts, specifically with military objectives, are quite few.   
The SPACECAST 2020 and AIR FORCE 2025 teams focused their efforts 
generating future mission concepts and creating ideas for innovative technological 
solutions.  They then used sensitivity analysis to help the decision maker determine the 
most robust options that would be useful across a broad spectrum of future realities.  Both 
efforts enlisted the aid of Department of Defense (DoD) subject matter experts to create 
lists of possible future technologies (Parnell 1997, 1999) then attempted to lay them in 
against future scenarios. 
One of the greatest challenges with this type of uncertainty-mitigating endeavor is 
to define a list of outcomes that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, and 
then assign probabilities to each outcome (Parnell 1999).  The problem with applying this 
kind of technique to the long-range future is that there is no way to be sure that the 
analyst has included all possible outcomes.  Indeed, there are far too many unknowns to 
quantify a solid probability of any outcome.  One way to address this challenge is to 
assess different multi-objective weights for each alternate future, then use those weights 
to conduct a sensitivity analysis to identify the Research & Development (R&D) concepts 
that have the most utility across the range of likely alternate futures (Parnell, 1999).   
For both of the benchmark AF studies (SPACECAST 2020 and Air Force 2025), 
the researchers considered the alternate futures to be synonymous with “scenarios.”   
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However, they could have just as easily applied the analysis to individual threat scenarios 
in the decision space of the respective alternative futures. 
2.2. Developing Future Scenarios 
 “Many people have assumed that their past experience is a fairly reliable 
guide to the future…However, the pace of change now makes it clear to 
thoughtful people that continuity can no longer be taken for 
granted…instead of predicting what the future will be, futurists use a wide 
range of methodologies to engage in structured and thoughtful speculation 
about future possibilities” (Institute for Alternative Futures). 
Any useful planning scenarios for the far future will need to be considered in the 
context of the world in the future.  For example, one set of threat scenarios is likely if the 
world of the future has made broad economic and technological advances and supports a 
healthy weapons market in the context of global proliferation.  Conversely, a different set 
of threat scenarios would be likely in a world of extreme political and economic 
polarization that dampened technological advancement and stifled the global economy. 
While developing a new and rich selection of future worlds, or scenario spaces, is 
beyond the scope of this research, it is still important to put together a context for 
scenario development.  To that end this research will investigate alternative futures 
already developed by reliable sources that are targeted at roughly the same time frame 
under investigation for the Air Force’s next-generation global strike vehicle 
(approximately 2025-2035). 
To ensure the alternative futures were developed with a sufficiently germane 
paradigm, preference will be given to studies done in support of military planning.  Next, 
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alternative futures derived from non-DoD studies but having an aerospace flavor will be 
considered.  Finally, government or credible non-government studies that address 
technology, warfare and/or the political-economic state of the world will be considered. 
Five examples stand out as being particularly useful for developing military threat 
scenarios in the 2020-2030 time frame.  The SPACECAST 2020 project was performed 
by Air University (AU) in 1994 in response to a Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) 
request for a systems acquisition strategy to address the future operational space systems 
of the Air Force (Parnell, 1994).  The project goal was to forecast the most likely space-
oriented worlds of the future (Parnell, 1994) and project the military systems that would 
be most advantageous in those worlds.  The Air Force 2025 project was performed by 
AU in 1997 in response to a CSAF request for a similar approach to identifying combat 
systems across the entire spectrum of the Air Force combat arena.  In a similar effort, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) investigated alternative futures 
to help generate a viable science strategy to address the future aerospace environment.   
More recently, the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 project (NIC, 2004), Mapping 
the Global Future took a broader look at several economic deterministic indicators to 
create global futures.  Finally, the US Army, via the RAND Corporation, conducted a 
futures study titled Alternate Futures and Army Force Planning (RAND, 2005) which 
continued in the military theme for alternative futures development. 
All five of the development efforts tended to follow a similar methodology for 
devising the alternative futures.   They relied on a panel of experts in various fields 
relevant to the study and employed several brainstorming and scenario building methods 
 9
to devise the future worlds.  The development also relied on extensive projections of 
current situations into the future to develop alternative scenarios, and (in some cases) 
devising a future world then “backcasting” to the present to discover a likely path. 
What follows is a brief summary of each of the strategies, insofar as their 
alternative futures are concerned, and an analysis of the common threads to discern a 
useful pattern or guiding conclusions to help develop relevant threat scenarios in a future 
world. 
2.2.1. SPACECAST 2020 (1994) 
The SPACECAST 2020 project team began by devising drivers that would shape 
future environments.  They initially generated a list of 60 drivers, and used affinity 
diagrams and other team techniques to reduce the drivers to 3 inclusive categories:  
Number of Actors with a Space Role, Will to Use Space, and Technomic Capability 
(defined as the technological proliferation and growth and economic vitality of the 
actors).  These three drivers were then given binary values (respectively: Many or Few, 
Strong or Weak, and Low or High).  
This exercise produced eight alternate futures, which the team named and then 
culled to what they determined were the four likeliest (highlighted in Table 1): 
Spacefaring, Mad Max Inc., Rogues, and SPACECAST (considered by the team to be the 
most likely of all the scenarios). 
Table 1: SPACECAST 2020 Alternative Futures 
 




Will to Use Space Scenario 
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1. Many High Strong SPACEFARING 
2. Many High Weak TERRESTRIAL FOCUS 
3. Many Low Strong MAD MAX, INC. 
4. Many Low Weak BALKANIZED 
5. Few High Strong SPACE BARONS 
6. Few High Weak SPACECAST 
7. Few Low Strong ROGUES 
8. Few Low Weak FUNDAMENTALIST 
 
2.2.2.  AIR FORCE 2025 (1997) 
The Air Force 2025 team used a variety of scientific and non-scientific methods 
to develop their list of drivers, and then ultimately selected 3 variables that incorporated a 
wide range of drivers (much like the SPACECAST 2020 effort).  Those drivers included 
the following, which were each given a binary value: 
American Worldview:  The US perspective of the world which drives its willingness and 
capability to take the lead in international affairs (value settings: Domestic or Global) 
ΔTeK:  The ability to employ technology.  It describes the rate of change in advancement 
and proliferation of technology (value settings: Constrained and Exponential) 
World Power Grid:  Describes the sources and control of political, military, economic 
and informational power throughout the world (value settings: Concentrated or 
Dispersed). 
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These three parameters generate eight distinct Future World Scenarios (Table 2), 
from which the team selected the four which seemed most applicable for planning 
because they exercised the extreme ranges of the chosen variables. 
Table 2: Air Force 2025 Alternative Futures 
 
World American World 
View 
ΔTeK World Power Grid Name 
1 Global Exponential Dispersed DIGITAL 
CACOPHONY 
2 Global Exponential Concentrated STAR TREK 
3 Global Constrained Dispersed GULLIVER’S 
TRAVAILS 
4 Global Constrained Concentrated PAX AMERICANA 
5 Domestic Exponential Dispersed BYTE! 
6 Domestic Exponential Concentrated ZAIBATSU 
7 Domestic Constrained Dispersed HOOVERVILLE 
8 Domestic Constrained Concentrated KING KHAN 
 
Digital Cacophony is a world of almost unlimited technology.  
Gulliver’s Travails is a world of rampant nationalism, state and non-state 
terrorism, and fluid coalitions. America’s ability to influence events is dispersed 
by the vast numbers of different actors.  
Zaibatsu is a world where the sovereignty of the nation-state has been diminished by 
profit-seeking multinational corporations. 
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King Khan is a world dominated by a foreign (Asian) superpower. The United States has 
become the “United Kingdom of the Twenty-first Century.”  
2.2.3.  NASA Study (1997) 
In the NASA study, the National Research Council developed five future world 
scenarios.  They began by establishing some basic economic, social and policy factors, 
then refined their models by considering the role of disruptive technologies, the key 
issues for aeronautics and the role NASA should take in the alternative futures.  The team 
established four main drivers, or dimensions; each with two distinct settings. 
U.S. Economic Competitiveness:  U.S. share of internationally traded products and 
services in the world economy (value setting: Strong or Weak) 
Worldwide Demand for Aeronautics Products and Services:  The level of demand for 
aeronautics products and services related to civil, military, and access to space 
applications (value settings: High Growth or Low Growth) 
Threats to Global Security and/or Quality of Life:  Direct threats to the health and safety 
of people, and/or the stability and viability of governments, and their implications for the 
United States (value settings: High Threat or Low Threat) 
Global Trend in Government Participation in Society:  The tendency of governments to 
regulate and/or intervene in key aspects of society and the economy (value settings: High 
or Low) 
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Combining the various settings for the four dimensions the team generated a total 
of 16 possible scenarios (Table 3).  The project team then selected five of the scenarios 
for further analysis based on their “potential challenges or opportunities they may hold 
for aeronautics.”  Following a common practice in this type of exercise, the five 
alternative futures were named to give them life in the minds of the developers:  Pushing 
the Envelope, Grounded, Regional Tensions, Trading Places, and Environmentally 
Challenged.   
Table 3: NASA's Five Development Scenarios 
 







Threats to Global 
Security and/or 
Quality of Life 






Strong High Growth Low Low 
GROUNDED Strong Low Growth High High 
REGIONAL 
TENSIONS 
Weak High Growth High High 
TRADING SPACES Weak High Growth Low Low 
ENVIRONMENTALLY 
CHALLENGED 
Weak Low Growth High High 
 
2.2.4.  National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2020 Project (2004) 
The NIC team, like the others, first conducted workshops and brainstorming 
sessions with a broad range of experts to develop alternative futures scenarios.  However, 
this project was conducted over a much longer time period (more than a year as opposed 
to a few months) and involved a broader range of experts and topics than in the other 
studies.  Admittedly, this “broadness” may seem to make the futures they developed less 
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applicable to the military environment, but the extensive development process and rich 
future scenarios actually appear, in some ways, to be even more relevant than the more 
focused studies in exploring likely US adversaries.  The fact that this study was 
completed in 2004 (as opposed to the mid/late 1990s for the more focused air and space 
projects) also lends contemporary relevance to the conclusions. 
Davos World:  Robust economic growth through 2019 reshapes the globalization process 
into a more non-western dynamic.  The “Asian giants” as well as other developing states 
continue to outpace most “Western” economies. Western powers must contend with job 
insecurity despite the many benefits from an expanding global economy. In spite of 
energy profits, the Middle East lags behind and threatens the future of globalization.  
Pax Americana:  US dominance survives changes to the global political landscape.  
Relationships with Europe and Asia evolve but retain a similar dynamic to today.  The 
United States still does the “heavy lifting” but has to struggle to “assert leadership in an 
increasingly diverse, complex, and fast-paced world.” 
A New Caliphate:  Genesis of an emerging global movement fueled by radical religious 
identity.  A new Caliphate is proclaimed and manages to advance a powerful counter 
ideology that has widespread appeal.   It is fueled by the popularized struggles of the new 
Caliph as he attempts to wrest control from traditional regimes.   This situation generates 
conflict and confusion within the Muslim world and outside between Muslims and the 
United States, Europe, Russia and China.  
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Cycle of Fear:  Concerns over proliferation have increased to the point that nations have 
taken large scale intrusive security measures.  Proliferators find it increasingly hard to 
operate, but with the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), more countries 
want to arm themselves for their own protection. The draconian measures increasingly 
implemented by governments to stem proliferation and guard against terrorism may have 
deleterious effects on globalization. 
2.2.5.  Army 2025 (2005) 
The US Army commissioned a RAND study to focus on the 2025 timeframe to 
help determine future force makeup.  The RAND team also began by defining key 
drivers: Geopolitics, Economics, Demographics, Technology and the Environment.  
Where the RAND study differed from the others under review was in the application of 
the variables.  Instead of assigning binary values, they projected three slopes for each 
variable: Good (positive for US interests), Medium (neutral for US interests) and Bad 
(negative for US interests).  Combining these variables in a 5x3 matrix generated 15 
alternative futures (Table 4, below) that covered the entire spectrum of possible futures 
(Figure 1, below).  The team then named each future and, through selection and merging, 
ended up with the 6 most likely alternative futures: 
U.S. Unipolarity:  The United States remains the world’s dominant power. The other 
great powers (in the team’s view: China, Russia, the European Union, and India) are 
unable and unwilling to challenge the U.S.-led international order. The US will still face 
threats from rogue regional and from scattered ethnic conflicts and humanitarian disasters 
in the poorest parts of the developing world.  
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Table 4: Army 2025 Alternative Futures Matrix 
 
Democratic Peace:  Liberal democracy and free, open markets have spread to such an 
extent that they are becoming institutionalized in all of the world’s great powers (Europe, 
India, China, Japan, Russia, Brazil) as well as most middle-ranking powers.  Spreading 
democracy has virtually eliminated the phenomenon of “rogue regional states”, so 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is not a major security issue. The 
key zones of instability in the Democratic Peace world are northern Latin America, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and parts of South Asia.   
Major Competitor Rising:   A near-peer competitor to the United States emerges with 
significant conventional and strategic nuclear capabilities that include a power projection 
force and dedicated military space assets. Specifically, a Sino-Russian Entente forms in 
2015–2018 with the goal of weakening America’s global position as well as that of its 
key allies. 
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Competitive Multi-polarity:  Two large powers emerge that are capable of challenging the 
United States on roughly equal terms.  Each of these three powers would build its own 
coalition at the expense of the other two. Conflict would take the form of an ongoing 
competition between fluid defensive alliances that treat small powers as pawns in the 
larger game.  The United States, Russia, and China each lead a major alliance system.  
Transnational Web:  The nation-state has lost a substantial amount of power to 
transnational actors (global corporations, criminal organizations, and terrorist networks) 
many of whom use the burgeoning Internet to coordinate their actions worldwide much 
more rapidly than can any national government bureaucracy.  Also envisioned is a 
dramatic growth in the threat to the United States posed by radical transnational “peace 
and social justice” groups, which identify the United States as an “arch-villain” standing 
in the way of their drive to reshape the global order. 
Chaos/Anarchy:  Overpopulation, environmental degradation, and ethnic strife cause the 
collapse of the nation-state in large swaths of the developing world. The power vacuum is 
filled by warlords who, lacking a tax base, turn to terrorism and the smuggling of 
contraband, narcotics, and weapons of mass destruction to support their regimes.  
 
Figure 1: Army 2025 Alternative Futures Continuum 
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2.2.6.  Synthesis  
One of the goals of alternative futures, at least in the business models, is to choose 
the most desirable one and work to bring it about.  This type of approach is especially 
useful for the aerospace industry study.  However, in the case of the military studies, the 
goal is not necessarily to work toward, or bring about any particular future.  Instead, the 
goal is to direct technology development to adequately cover all likely mission needs of 
anticipated in the future (within technical and economic constraints).  Conversely, the 
goal of this study is to presage the likely capabilities of likely adversaries so research 
efforts can be directed to countering those capabilities which may degrade U.S. airpower 
advantages.  To that end, there are two archetypes of adversary that would pose different 
challenges for engagement by a global, military strike capability: State Actor and Non-
State Actor. 
 The five alternative-futures studies reviewed for this research do share some 
common threads that manifest as useful patterns.   For example, Mad Max Inc. 
(Spacecast 2020), Zaibatsu (AF 2025,) and Grounded (NASA) all posit a future world 
where multinational corporations have degraded the power of the nation state and drive a 
global market of an increasing number of well equipped and financially robust actors.  
Similarly, Gulliver’s Travails (AF 2025), Pax Americana (NIC 2020), and Democratic 
Peace (Army 2025) all envision a world that, while at relative peace due to the influence 
of strong hegemonic powers, is bubbling with unrest as multiple, low-intensity conflicts 
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When considered through the perspective of the two adversarial types of interest 
(State Actors and Non-State Actors) the future world scenarios can be grouped to indicate 
which type of global environment they presage (Table 6, below).  For example, 
Spacefaring (Spacecast 2020) indicates several powerful and economically sound state 
actors, while Digital Cacophony may predict a world with such advanced technology and 
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interconnected information resources that even the least of the non-state adversaries may 
be capable of posing a significant challenge to our nation’s sovereign options. 
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 When all scenarios are considered together, it may be possible to predict the 
likelihood of the United States facing a particular type of adversary.  Additionally, when 
considering the driving factors that generate the alternative future worlds, it may be 
feasible to predict (using a more linear approach) which entities of today (state and non-
state) would be in position to take advantage of a particular world scenario. 
2.3. Mapping Technology Trends  
“While U.S. air dominance is unlikely to be jeopardized by symmetric 
means, particularly in the near term, technology trends in 
commercialization and globalization suggest that new types of threats may 
be on the horizon.” (National Research Council, 2005) 
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Inherent in their nature, all alternative-futures studies contain within them an 
assumption, either implicit or explicit, of the level of technological advancement in the 
future.  To be useful, this assumption must be based on some reasonable prediction 
methodology.  Often, these predictions are based on historic data and follow an 
incremental or linear pathway to the future.  Even the exponential nature of Moore’s Law 
is based on an assumption (heretofore born out) that computer processing power will 
continue to double every 18 months.  Consequently, “The art of predicting technological 
innovation is often little more than market research in mainstream scientific trends” 
(Land Warfare Conference, 2002).  Unfortunately, as convenient as linear projections are 
to create, they cannot predict non-linear advancements or novel uses of a particular 
advancement.   
A 2005 National Research Council (NRC) study established that globalization and 
powerful market forces, along with a relative small US investment in R&D, present a 
challenge to the US and require a technology warning mechanism to protect US interests.  
Of particular concern are potentially disruptive technologies which, “while not seen as a 
near term threat, are viewed as one to which the United States is most vulnerable.” 
Supported by a 2001 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) technology estimate, the 
NRC outlined several technologies (delineated into three tiers) that may impact national 
security by 2015.  These technologies become even more prescient when considering the 
2020-2030 time period, as they will have had more time to evolve into fieldable systems.   
Higher tiers are more likely to have greater impact than lower tiers, so the three tiers may 
be also be considered to have a High, Medium and Low likelihood of coming to fruition 
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(in a negative way to US security).  A fourth category, “other technologies considered,” 
may also be considered to have a very low likelihood of impacting US security.  
 
Figure 2: Candidate Technologies Likely to Impact National Security by 2015 
 
In addition to general technology trends, the NRC study looked specifically at 
threats to US airpower in an urban environment.  Those results are particularly useful to 
this research because built-up areas are more likely to have advanced IADs capability and 
are also the areas best able to make use of disruptive technologies (e.g., passive bi-static 
radar) when and if they become available.  According to the NRC estimates, today’s 
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U.S.-produced aircraft are assembled from parts largely made overseas, and U.S. 
aerospace and electronics companies have, in effect, built up aerospace research, 
development, and manufacturing capability in other countries by setting up overseas 
research organizations—albeit for legitimate economic reasons.  
The report covers several key technology areas that should be of concern to the 
AFRL global strike project.  For example analysts address the challenges to US radar 
stealth.   
“To negate U.S. radar stealth advantages directly requires the development 
of radars with different and improved characteristics. For example, the 
power of the radar can be increased to illuminate even small RCS targets. 
Changes in frequencies and radar-emanation management can also help. 
On an indirect basis, other sensors could be perfected that can precisely 
track aircraft, such as improved infrared (IR) or optical sensors. All of 
these require a high degree of sophistication to invent, but they can be sold 
to and used by relatively unsophisticated buyers with hostile intentions.” 
(NRC, 2005) 
 
To address these types of technology threats the NRC team established system-
level performance parameters to evaluate the foundations of new technologies to 
determine how and to what degree they can challenge U.S. airpower.   One example is 
their treatment of “Increased effectiveness of man-portable air defense systems 
(MANPADSs).”   What follows is taken from the MANPADS section of the report as an 
example of the types of considerations explored and the depth of analysis applied to 
several relevant technology areas. 
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Increased Range and/or Reduced Signature 
•Increasing range. Improving this characteristic would increase the threat 
footprint; threaten mid and high-altitude aircraft, including ISR assets; and 
increase the slant range so that, for example, transports that stay within an airport 
perimeter would be at risk from remote launch sites. 
• Low-optical-emission propulsion. Many aircraft missile countermeasure systems 
use the optical emission from the missile launch to queue the defense. Thus, no 
signature, no warning, no defense. Extending the definition of reduced optical 
emission to include smoke helps to mask the launch location and thus increase the 
tactical utility of the missile. 
Enhanced Guidance, Navigation, and/or Targeting 
• Multimode seekers. This improved technology would reduce or eliminate the 
effectiveness of countermeasures or permit non-line-of-sight launches. In addition 
to multiple optical bands (an approach currently popular), this might include 
acoustic or RF cues to allow a missile launch against a target not in sight from the 
launch position. With sufficient range and RF seeker performance, large radar and 
battle management aircraft can be placed under threat. 
• Increased accuracy guidance. The warhead size of a man-portable missile is of 
the order of a kilogram. Thus, it must detonate very close to a critical location to 
be effective. Increased guidance accuracy, along with any necessary increase in 
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maneuverability, will improve the lethality of these small missiles, especially 
against large aircraft. 
Enhanced Lethality 
• Autonomous launch. With sufficiently capable sensors, automated decision 
making, and hardening, these small missiles can act as aerial mines, threatening 
any aircraft that flies within range. Remote queuing could increase the 
effectiveness of such systems. 
• Expanded mission capability. By integrating relatively simple GPS guidance, 
laser capability for precise geolocation, and data link capability, an adversary 
could transform a MANPADS from a surface-to-air weapon into one that can also 
perform precision engagement missions in the ground-to-ground role in a wide 
variety of mission areas. 
The NRC team then used their established methodology to evaluate the 
supporting technologies that would make the new threat capability possible.  The 
methodology looks at two main indicators: Accessibility and Maturity.   
Accessibility addresses the ability of an adversary to gain access to and exploit a given 
technology.  
Level 1. Technology is available through the Internet, being a commercial off-the-shelf 
item; low sophistication is required to exploit it.  
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Level 2. The technology would require a small investment (hundreds of dollars to a few 
hundred thousand dollars) in facilities and/or expertise. 
Level 3. The technology would require a major investment (millions to billions of dollars) 
in facilities and/or expertise. Level 3 would likely require a state actor. 
Maturity addresses how much is known about an adversary’s intentions to exploit the 
technology.  
Futures. Create a technology roadmap and forecast; identify potential observables to aid 
in the tracking of technological advances. 
Technology Watch. Monitor (global) communications and publications for breakthroughs 
and integrations. 
Technology Warning. Positive observables indicate that a prototype has been achieved. 
Technology Alert. An adversary has been identified and operational capability is known 
to exist. 
Several examples of relevant technologies are addressed and help establish 
likelihood’s and consequences of individual advancements (Table 7). From these 
examples, one could generate a risk matrix that would indicate the risk of technology 
development and employment for use in a probabilistic decision analysis technique. 
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Table 7: Technology Warning Assessment Matrix 
 
Tech Item Accessibility Maturity Consequence 
Small Low-Cost Jet Engines Level 2 Warning Negate man-portable air defense 
system (MANPADS) launch 
warning; greatly extend MANPADS 
range; extend unmanned aerial 
vehicle range (to thousands of 
kilometers) and speed. 
Storable liquid propellant, micro 
rocket engines 
Level 3 Warning Negate man-portable air defense 
system (MANPADS) launch 
warning; extend MANPADS range; 
anti-satellite interceptors; micro 
intercontinental ballistic missile or 
launch vehicles. 
Higher Performance Small rocket 
engines 
Level 3 Watch Small intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and space launchers 
Nanoscale surface machining Level 2 Watch Optical/Infrared (IR) Stealth 
Electronically tuned surface 
coatings 
Level 2 Warning Optical/IR Stealth 
Negative Index of refraction 
materials 
Level 2 Watch Improved infrared, optical and RF 
stealth 
Low cost, uncooled, low noise 
infrared detector arrays 
(especially mid-wave and long-
wave) 
Level 2 Warning Improved capability and range in 
man-portable air defense systems 
Narrowband, tunable frequency 
agile, imaging infrared optical 
filters 
Level 2 Warning Improved capability, 
countermeasure robust man-portable 
air defense systems. 
High-accuracy 
microelectromechanical systems 
(MEMS) gyros and 
accelerometers 
Level 3 Warning Very Long range small unmanned 
aerial vehicles, missiles and launch 
vehicles. 
Automated, ad hoc, cellular 
phone/computer systems 
Level 1 Alert Remote queuing/targeting for man-
portable air defense systems and 
mines; large, informal sensor and/or 
computer arrays for anti-stealth 
High-speed processor chips and 
mega-flash memories 
Level 2 Warning Targeting and/or discrimination 
algorithms 
Increased energy density or slow-
burning energetic materials  
Level 2 Watch Extend man-portable air defense 
systems range; increase lethality 
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Tech Item Accessibility Maturity Consequence 
Very low cost Radio Frequency 
(RF) proximity fuses 
Level 2 Warning Aerial mines 
Increased speed digital signal 
processor and processor chips 
Level 3 Warning  Anti-fuse systems 
Very high pulse power systems Level 2 Warning Non-Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse 
(EMP) 
Tactical Nuclear EMP UNK UNK Disable AC while in flight or on the 
ground 
Wireless technology, frequency 
modulation techniques, global 
positioning system crypto capture 
Jamming: Level 1 




Improved, low-cost Global 
Positioning System (GPS) jammers 
and spoofers. 




2.4. Risk Filtering Ranking and Management (RFRM) 
 
Risk Filtering Ranking and Management (RFRM) is a method of Risk Scenario 
Development created by Yacov Haimes.  It is a “…modified and much-improved version 
of Risk Ranking and Filtering developed for NASA in the early 1990s.” (Haimes).  It is 
also a specific and philosophical application of Haimes standard, 5-step risk assessment 
process: 
1. Risk Identification 
2. Risk Modeling, Quantification and Measurement 
3. Risk Evaluation 
4. Risk Acceptance and Avoidance 
5. Risk Management 
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In RFRM, likelihood is used as a general estimation of the probability of a 
scenario occurring.  The likelihood estimate is based on available evidence and assigns a 
probability of occurrence to each scenario (in place of the true, unknown probability of 
the scenario occurring).  The evidence may be objective (as in the case of historical data) 
or subjective (subject matter expert opinion).  Either type of evidence is valid but each 
relies on different theories for analysis.  The Frequentist view says that if the scenario 
happens repeatedly then the question “how frequently” can be asked, and the answer can 
be expressed in occurrence per unit time or frequency.  On other hand, the Bayesian 
method says that if the scenario is not recurrent then assignment of occurrence is 
subjective in the sense that it describes a state of knowledge rather than any property of 
the real world.  However, it is objective in the sense that it should be independent of the 
personality of the user.  Users with common knowledge, analysis ability, and expertise 
should assign the same probability to a particular scenario. 
The 5-Step risk assessment process described by Haimes is designed to bring out 
the scenarios most useful to the decision maker.  The first step, Risk Identification, 
answers the question “What can go wrong?”  This step involves identifying risk scenarios 
while taking into account the sources and nature of the likely risk.  Obviously, analysis of 
real world problems can produce hundreds or thousands of scenarios.  Since it is 
time/resource prohibitive to perform quantitative risk analysis on all these scenarios, 
Haimes developed a methodology to establish priorities among a large number of 
scenarios to identify the most important contributors to risk.  This methodology is the 
RFRM process. 
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There are eight phases to the RFRM method:  Scenario Identification, Scenario 
Filtering, Bicriteria Filtering and Ranking, Multicriteria Evaluation, Quantitative 
Ranking, Risk Management, Safeguarding against Missing Critical Items, and 
Operational Feedback.  Each phase is specifically designed to help hone in on the most 
critical areas for the decision maker’s attention.  To illustrate the technique, an example is 
provided that considers the bed down decision for an interceptor battery component of 
the national missile defense system (NMD). 
Phase 1:  Identifying Risk Scenarios through Hierarchical Holographic 
Modeling:  Identify all “success” scenarios and all “risk” scenarios.  To do this Haimes 
uses a technique he developed termed Hierarchical Holographic Modeling (HHM).  
HHM provides multiple decompositions (perspectives or views) of a given problem.  
Each of the decompositions has its own unique qualities, issues, limitations, and factors.  
The result of the HHM generation process is the creation of a number of risk scenarios, 
hierarchically organized into set and subsets.  Identification will probably contain 
hundreds if not thousands of risk scenarios, but the final product will be a set of HHM 
diagrams and a list of risk scenarios.   
 For the bed down example there are four head topics (see Figure 4): Physical 
Infrastructure, Safety and Security, Personnel Support, and Operations and Maintenance.  
Based on research, experience and expert opinion, several risk scenarios were generated 
under each head topic.  The HHM shows just the title, but each scenario must be 
developed and supported with real data to add value to the model.  For example, under 
the Operations and Maintenance head topic, one risk scenario category is titled Mission 
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Conflict.  One of the risk scenarios (there may be one or several in each category) posits 
that a space lift mission is in terminal countdown when an enemy launches a surprise 
ICBM attack.  This eventuality if not properly understood and planned for could create 
conflicts in range assets, command and control and public safety.  Technical and 
management details of the scenario would then be developed to the point where a 
decision maker could properly understand the implications and take effective action to 
deal with the risk. 
 
Figure 3: NMD Example--HHM 
Missile 























































Phase 2:   Scenario Filtering Based  Temporal Domain, and Level of 
Decisio
 on Scope,
n Making:   The risk scenarios identified in Phase 1 are filtered (at the subtopic 
level) according to the responsibilities and interests of the decision maker (DM).  As 
previously stated the number of “subtopics” may easily be in the hundreds or thousands.  
Therefore, not all these subtopics will be of immediate concern to the decision maker(s). 
Typical filtering criteria for this first look center on the decision maker’s perspective and 
which items are of particular relevance to him/her.  This selective filtering is why the 
single HHM could be of value to decision makers at several levels.  The director of the 
Missile Defense Agency would filter different risks than would the chief of security 
forces at the bed down location. Regardless of the DM this initial filtering would ideally 
produce a list of no more than 50 risk scenarios.  Figure 5 shows how a sample DM 
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Figure 4: NMD Example--Filtered HHM 
Phase 3: Bi-criteria Filtering and Ranking:  The remaining risk scenarios 
identified in Phase 2 are further filtered by assigning a qualitative likelihood and 
consequence to each scenario.   This process uses the ordinal version of the USAF Risk 
Matrix (MIL-STD 882D, US Dept of Defense, Standard Practice for System Safety).  The 
HHM subtopics (scenario categories) are distributed to the cells of the risk matrix.  Those 
subtopics falling in the low-risk boxes are filtered out and set aside for later 
consideration.   This phase produces a further filtered list of “risk” scenarios.  Note, that 
 34
in the example Bi-criteria Matrix (Table 7) each scenario has been given an alphanumeric 
designator to allow easy reference to a master scenario list.  



























Phase 4: Multicriteria Evaluation:  In this phase, each risk scenario is evaluated 
on more detailed consequence criteria. Haimes includes a list of 3 system attributes and 
11 criteria.  The 3 attribute categories are scored based on the ability of each risk scenario 
to impact the system in the areas of:  Redundancy (Ability of extra components of a 
system to assume the functions of failed components), Resiliency (Ability of the system 
to recover following a failure or emergency), and Robustness (Insensitivity of system 
performance to external stresses).  These 3 categories are broken down into 11 criteria for 
detailed evaluation (Haimes, 2004): 
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Undetectability refers to the absence of modes by which the initial event of a 
scenario can be discovered before harm occurs. 
Uncontrollability refers to the absence of control modes that make it possible to 
take action or make an adjustment to prevent harm. 
Multiple paths to failure indicates that there are multiple and possibly unknown 
ways for the events of a scenario to harm the system, such as circumventing 
safety devices, for example. 
Irreversibility indicates a scenario in which the adverse condition cannot be 
returned to the initial, operational (pre-event) condition. 
Duration of effects indicates a scenario that would have a long duration of adverse 
consequences. 
Cascading effects indicates a scenario where the effects of an adverse condition 
readily propagate to the other subsystems of a system, i.e., cannot be contained. 
Operating environment indicates a scenario that results from external stressors. 
Wear and Tear indicates a scenario that results from use, leading to degraded 
performance. 
HW/SW/HU/OR interfaces indicate a scenario in which the adverse outcome is 
magnified by interfaces among diverse subsystems (e.g., human and hardware). 
Complexity/emergent behaviors indicate a scenario in which there is a potential 
for system-level behaviors that are not anticipated even with knowledge of the 
components and the laws of their interactions. 
Design immaturity indicates a scenario in which the adverse consequences are 
related to the newness of the system design of other lack of a proven concept. 
 
Each criterion is then scored such that a higher value indicates higher 
consequence.  Qualitative descriptions such as “not applicable”, “low”, “medium”, or 
“high” can suffice in the place of a quantitative score.  Haimes gives no preferred 
methodology for assessing the overall risk level, so the analyst must give careful 
consideration to the relevance and weight of each criterion for the particular scenario 
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under consideration.  A sampling of this analysis from the bed down example is in Table 
9.  The sample shows that scenario S13 has been filtered based on the severity of a failure 
relative to other scenarios. 
Table 9: NMD Example--Multicriteria Filtering (Partial List) 
LMLLMMLLMHMS13 - Interceptor effectiveness may be reduced 
in certain types of weather.
Weather
MMLHMHMLHMHS7 - Maintenance issues cause an increased 
number of interceptors to be unavailable, 
causing the effectiveness of the system to be 
decreased.
Maintenance
MMMMHMMMMLLS4 - Detection resources are not operational 
which allows enemy ICBMs to intrude US 
airspace without warning.
Detection
HMLLHLHHLMLS2 - Adequate number of interceptors are not 
operational to defeat incoming ICBM 





Phase 5: Quantitative Ranking:  In this phase the likelihood of each scenario is 
quantified based on the totality of relevant evidence available (using Bayes’ theorem 
where necessary to process the evidence items).  Calculating these quantitative 
likelihoods helps to avoid miscommunication when interpreting qualitative likelihoods 
(Phase 3) such as “unlikely”, “seldom”, “occasional”, “likely”, and “frequent.” When 
combined with the results from Phase 4, the quantified rankings produce a cardinal 
version of the Phase 3 ordinal risk matrix.    
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Phase 6: Risk Management:  In this phase, the risk management options to deal 
with risk scenarios are identified and compared based on the cost, benefits, and risk 
reduction.  From a DoD perspective, this is the phase to consider the traditional risk 
handling options of Control, Transfer, Avoidance, and Acceptance. 
Phase 7: Safeguarding Against Missing Critical Items:  In this phase it is 
important to take stock of the progress so far.  It is possible that in reducing the initial 
risk scenarios to a smaller set scenarios may have filtered out that, while seeming minor 
at the time, may actually become important if the risk management options developed in 
Phase 6 are implemented. So Phase 7 is an opportunity to evaluate the performance of 
Phase 6 options against previously filtered scenarios. The guiding principle in this phase 
is the system’s intra-dependencies and interdependencies that may have been overlooked.  
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Each of the remaining scenarios is examined to determine whether it is dependent upon 
any filtered scenario.   If a filtered scenario is significantly impacted, then it must be 
returned to the table for consideration and risk management.    
Phase 8: Operational Feedback:  This final phase uses the experience and 
information gained during implementation of the chosen option(s) to refine the scenario 
filtering and decision processes of earlier phases.  Of course, this phase is not possible on 
the first iteration, but can be invaluable for adjusting assumptions when reworking the 
scenarios. 
2.5. Analyzing Variables (Decision Trees and Risk Profiles) 
In addition to developing and filtering scenarios, there are several decision 
analysis techniques to aid in the final determination.  One example of particular value to 
this research is a decision analysis approach employed to consider installing anti-missile 
systems on commercial aircraft (von Winterfeldt, 2006).  The authors first established 
relevant variables that could impact a decision maker’s choices (e.g., cost of the system, 
cost of the plane, value of life, etc.).  They then used open source information to establish 
a reasonable minimum, maximum and base case value for each variable.  Using this 
information they created a logical decision tree to explore the expected economic effects 
a terrorist strike w/MANPADS would have on the airline industry and U.S. economy.   
Interestingly, the researchers discovered that many of the variables one might 
normally consider in a decision actually had no impact on the decision outcome when 
subjected to sensitivity analysis.  For example, loss of life, even when valued at $10M per 
person on a 400 person passenger jet, was not a significant factor in deciding whether or 
 39
not to install the anti-missile system.  Instead, the riving force turned out to be the impact 
to the transportation industry and the entire U.S. economy.   
This technique seems to have value for applying decision analysis to future 
scenarios as well.  Even though no exact values of relevant variables are available, it is 
still possible to generate a range a values that most experts would agree upon.  While the 
wide range may, in some cases, limit the usefulness of the analysis, it may also 
demonstrate that the values of some variables are irrelevant and do not merit research or 
discussion.  This type of focusing tool could be extremely useful when deciding where to 
apply research and development resources. 
In addition to demonstrating the powerful application of sensitivity analysis to an 
aerospace industry problem, the authors also showed that a risk profile could present a 
strong visual impression to a decision maker (Figure x, below).  The visual representation 
of expected equivalent cost against the probability of incurring those costs can be quickly 
overlaid onto a decision maker’s risk preferences.  For example, investing in 
countermeasures (CM) will most likely incur costs in to the $10B-$19B range.  But not 




Figure 5: Expected Equivalent Costs vs. Probability 
 
2.6. Summary 
There are three primary areas that will form the foundation of this research.  To 
create the scenario space and provide a context for threat technologies, this research 
examined several germane alternative futures posited by experts over the course of five 
comprehensive future world studies.  To provide a framework for evaluating specific 
threat technologies, the Threat Warning System of the National Intelligence Council was 
established the foundation document, which will be supported by multiple secondary 
sources for scenario development.  Finally the Risk Filtering Ranking and Management 
(RFRM) process was explored and validated as a possible technique to capture, evaluate 
and select relevant threat scenarios for consideration by design teams and decision 
makers working on the global strike vehicle concept for the US Air Force. 
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3. Identification of Risk Scenarios 
 
There are three elements to the process that will ultimately support this research 
and aid the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) design decision strategy.  The first is the 
development of a Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) that will identify the elements 
of the air vehicle that are most vulnerable to technology inspired risk scenarios.  The 
second element (and part of the HHM process) is the creation of a scoring mechanism to 
weigh the likelihoods of each scenario within the context of an alternative future.  The 
final piece will be to evaluate candidate scenarios that would benefit the decision maker 
through further development and analysis. 
3.1. HHM Assumptions (framing the analysis) 
Like all modern weapon systems, any US Air Force global strike vehicle will 
likely be designed as an integrated element of a larger “system of systems” (Figure 6)   
This is relevant for two reasons.  First, all of the major systems must work properly for 
the strike vehicle to operate. So, for the purpose of this research, if a system is 
substantially damaged, it will be considered inoperative in the scenarios developed.  
Second, even though a thorough systems approach would consider external elements 
beyond the strike vehicle system boundary, this research will focus solely on the area 
inside the strike vehicle system boundary and on direct threats to the strike vehicle.  
Consequently, Command and Control (e.g., external data links network), Logistics 
Support (e.g., aerial refueling), Navigation Signals (GPS Constellation), and 
communications (COMSAT), will not be considered as interdiction targets for the 
enemy—even though striking these nodes could derail the mission just as effectively as 
destroying the strike vehicle.  Additionally, the offensive weapon systems of the strike 
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vehicle will not be considered in the analysis.  Even though the failure of the weapon to 
successfully engage its intended target may result in mission failure, such a failure is not 
















Figure 6: System Boundary Diagram 
 
3.2. Building the HHM 
A basic HHM for an aircraft system should contain at least the following areas of 
concern: Avionics, Propulsion, Structure, Payload, Landing Gear, Defensive Systems, 
Power and Software.  Likewise, the head topics for the HHM (Figure 7) should mirror 










Figure 7: Strike Vehicle Top Level HHM 
Once these head topics are established they can be broken down into sub-areas 
that have relevance to the problem under consideration (Figure 8).  Ideally, each head 
topic should be decomposed to a low enough level to ensure there is little or no overlap 











































Figure 8: Strike Vehicle Expanded HHM 
 
3.3. Initial Filtering Based on Decision Maker’s Perspective 
In the case of the global strike vehicle, the AFRL (for this project) is principally 
concerned with direct threats to strike vehicle survival in enemy air space.  Consequently 
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some of these topics can be immediately truncated from the perspective of the decision 
maker (Figure 9).  Of particular note are the Payload system, the Landing Gear system 
and the Software system.  The payload (i.e. weapon load), while certainly important for 
successfully completing the mission, is not a factor to consider in developing strike 
vehicle survival systems.  Likewise, the landing gear—important for take off and 
landing—is not a significant factor in developing threat scenarios.   Software, while 
obviously important for the design and operation of the system, is not directly targetable 
by projected enemy defensive systems.  Though the systems controlled by the software 
are certainly targets of enemy air defenses, it is the physical failure of those systems that 
is of importance here, so there do not seem to be any significant ties that require the 














































Figure 9: Strike Vehicle HHM with Initial Redactions 
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3.4. Scenario Generation from the HHM Decomposition 
From this revised array of subtopics, one can develop several rudimentary 
scenarios based on the general categories of threats indicated in the research.  For review, 
the major threat categories under consideration are Advanced Missile Systems, Directed 
Energy Systems, Electromagnetic Pulse Systems, and Advanced Detection Systems.   
The scenarios proposed are believed to capture the most significant impacts certain 
weapons effects could have on a typical military strike aircraft.   However, it is certainly 
possible that flight vehicle experts may be aware of other significant areas of 
vulnerability (published or unpublished) that could be used to broaden the scope of 
plausible scenarios.  Extremely improbable scenarios were left off the list (e.g., crew 
incapacitated but vehicle otherwise fully operational), as well as those that posited 
outcomes with negligible consequences (e.g., temporary disruption in voice comm. due to 
weak EMP interference). 
3.4.1 Avionics 
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
UAVs as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system.  A non-
nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely 
overloads and disables the strike vehicle sensors, but flight control is unaffected. 
S1a - Flight Avionics (EMP2):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
Surface to Air Missiles.  A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile 
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight control systems. 
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S2 - Navigation (EMP1):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range UAVs 
as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system.  A non-nuclear, 
wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads 
and disables the strike vehicle navigation systems. 
S2a - Navigation (EMP2):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
Surface to Air Missiles.  A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile 
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle navigation systems. 
S3 - Navigation (Conventional):  An adversary employs advanced algorithms and high 
speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to desired 
target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures.  A missile warhead 
with a conventional explosive detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the strike 
vehicle—damaging the strike vehicle navigation systems. 
S4 - Sensors (EMP1):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range UAVs as a 
system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system.  A non-nuclear, wide 
area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads and 
disables the strike vehicle sensor systems. 
S4a - Sensors (EMP2):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range Surface to 
Air Missiles.  A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile completely 
overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight sensor systems. 
S5 - Sensors (Conventional):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
Surface to Air Missiles.  A missile warhead with a conventional explosive is diverted 
from the strike vehicle by countermeasures, but still detonates close enough to the strike 
vehicle to disable multiple sensors (e.g., radar, IR, etc.) 
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S6 - Communications (EMP1):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
UAVs as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system.  A non-
nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely 
overloads and disables the strike vehicle communications systems. 
S6a - Communications (EMP2):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
Surface to Air Missiles.  A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile 
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight communications 
systems. 
S7 - Communications (Conventional):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long 
range Surface to Air Missiles.  A missile warhead with a conventional explosive is 
diverted from the strike vehicle by countermeasures, but still detonates close enough to 
the strike vehicle to disable the communications array. 
S8 - Data Links (EMP1):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range UAVs 
as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system.  A non-nuclear, 
wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads 
and disables the strike vehicle flight data links. 
S8a - Data Links (EMP2):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
Surface to Air Missiles.  A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile 
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle flight data links. 
S9 - Data Links (Conventional):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long range 
Surface to Air Missiles.  A missile warhead with a conventional explosive is diverted 
from the strike vehicle by countermeasures, but still detonates close enough to the strike 
vehicle to disable the data links. 
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S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very 
long range UAVs as a system of UAV-based EMP aerial mines as part of an IAD system.  
A non-nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst from a UAV aerial mine 
completely overloads and disables the strike vehicle aircraft management system. 
S10a - Aircraft Management System (EMP2):  An adversary employs MEMS to field 
very long range Surface to Air Missiles.  A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an 
EMP missile completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle aircraft 
management system. 
3.4.2 Propulsion 
S11 - Fuel System (Conventional):  An adversary employs advanced algorithms and high 
speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to desired 
target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures.  A missile warhead 
with a conventional explosive detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the strike 
vehicle—damaging the strike vehicle fuel system. 
S12 - Fuel System (DEW):  An adversary fields a long range, ground-based directed 
energy weapon (400+ miles)—effectively nullifying existing threat countermeasures 
designed for diverting missiles. A DEW burst (Laser) ignites the internal strike vehicle 
fuel bladders, causing spontaneous combustion of the vehicle. 
S13 - Engine (Conventional):  An adversary fields a highly sensitive, integrated IR 
detection system that can sense extremely low levels of IR radiation from strike vehicle 
heat sources—effectively degrading the IR stealth features of the strike vehicle.  An IR 
missile with a conventional explosive locks on the strike vehicle’s engine exhaust, 
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penetrates through the weakened defensive systems and effectively destroys the strike 
vehicle engine. 
3.4.3 Structure 
S14 - Air Frame (Conventional):  An adversary employs advanced algorithms and high 
speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to desired 
target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures.  A missile warhead 
with conventional explosives detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the strike 
vehicle—critically degrading multiple airframe components. 
S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional):  An adversary employs advanced algorithms and 
high speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability to lock on to 
desired target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures.  A missile 
warhead with conventional explosives detonates close enough to project shrapnel into the 
strike vehicle—damaging multiple flight control surfaces. 
3.4.4 Defensive Systems 
S16 - Flares/Chaff Damaged (Conventional):  An adversary fields an integrated, multi-
static radar detection system that can defeat current USAF passive RF stealth 
technology—effectively degrading the passive stealth system.  The adversary launches a 
large salvo of SAMs in the vicinity of the strike vehicle, and at least one a missile 
warhead with a conventional explosive detonates close enough to project shrapnel into 
the strike vehicle—disabling the strike vehicle flare dispenser, chaff dispenser and/or EW 
transmission hardware 
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S17 - Flares/Chaff/ECM Degraded (Multiseeker technology):  An adversary fields a long 
range multi-seeker missile system powered by small jet engines that are difficult to detect 
on the vehicles on-board RF/IR/Optical detection systems—effectively creating a smart, 
stealthy missile that will ignore chaff, flares and even some EW.   
S18 - ESM/DAS degraded (smart/stealthy missiles):  An adversary employs advanced 
algorithms and high speed processors in a multi-seeker missile system to increase ability 
to lock on to desired target—partially negates current physical and EW defense measures. 
S19 - ESM/DAS destroyed (EMP1):  An adversary fields a system of UAV-based EMP 
aerial mines as part of an IAD system.  A non-nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) 
burst from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads and disables the strike vehicle 
electrical system. 
S19a - ESM/DAS damaged (EMP2):  An adversary employs MEMS to field very long 
range Surface to Air Missiles.  A non-nuclear, wide area EM burst from an EMP missile 
completely overloads and temporarily disables the strike vehicle Defensive Aids System 
(DAS). 
S20 - Passive Stealth degraded (Conventional):  A missile warhead with a conventional 
explosive detonates close enough to project limited shrapnel into the strike vehicle—the 
aircraft is unaffected except that the stealth skin of the strike vehicle is impacted, 
significantly degrading its stealth properties and making it vulnerable to conventional on-
board missile tracking systems. 
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S21 - Passive Stealth degraded (Multi-static):  An adversary fields an integrated, multi-
static radar detection system that can defeat current USAF passive RF stealth 
technology—effectively degrading the passive stealth system.  
S21a - Passive Stealth degraded (“Multi-Static” cellular networks):  An adversary 
utilizes ambient RF signals to create a virtual detection array capable of sensing vehicles 
employing passive stealth systems—effectively degrading the passive stealth system. 
S22 - Passive Stealth degraded (DEW):  An adversary fields an airborne, medium range 
directed energy weapon.   The DEW (laser) manages to superheat and warp the passive 
stealth skin of the strike vehicle without detection—effectively nullifying the stealth 
properties and making the vehicle vulnerable to less capable IADs components. 
3.4.5 Power 
S23 - Electrical System (EMP):  An adversary fields a system of UAV-based EMP aerial 
mines as part of an IAD system.  A non-nuclear, wide area Electro-Magnetic (EM) burst 
from a UAV aerial mine completely overloads and disables the strike vehicle electrical 
system. 
3.5. Bi-criteria Filtering 
After establishing the pool of scenarios, the next step is to subject each scenario to 
the bi-criteria filtering process—essentially assigning a likelihood and consequence to 
each scenario to determine the potential impact each scenario outcome could have on the 
strike vehicle mission.  While the process sounds rudimentary, it is perhaps the most 
important step for guiding the decision maker’s strategy.  Additionally, since all of the 
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scenarios under review are projections of possible systems in the future, it is necessary to 
devise a credible means of assigning probabilities to each.   
To determine the likelihood of a given scenario, this research first considers the 
technical requirements.  In the National Intelligence Council’s evaluation, each 
technology under consideration was determined to be of very low threat or scored 
progressively as Watch, Warning or Alert—which equates nicely to an very high, high, 
moderate or low requirement for technical advancement.  For example, the “alert” 
technologies are practically in the field now, so an advanced technology future is not 
necessarily required to bring them to fruition (though a robust economy may be 
necessary).  Similarly, each of the candidate technologies is scored as a level 1, 2 or 3 for 
financial and resource accessibility.  According to the technology estimate, level 3 
technologies would likely require the resources of a significant state actor (or extremely 
powerful non-state actor), while level 2 technologies would likely be attainable within the 
means of well supplied non-state actors.  This being the case, there is still the requirement 
to control large areas of territory for effective employment of detection systems and there 
is still the overriding consideration of the technological and economic environment of the 
future under consideration. 
3.6. Predicting the Future 
In all five alternative futures studies examined for this research, the assumption is 
made that the developed scenarios cover all possible futures--at least to the extent that the 
full range of futures is revealed given a set of controlling variables.  Therefore, when 
assigning weights and considering alternatives, this research considers the data set at 
hand to be sufficiently complete and exhaustive. 
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In the NASA Study the National Academy of Sciences team did not associate a 
specific likelihood with each of the projected alternative futures so one might attach a 
default 1/16 chance of occurrence to each of the possible 16 scenarios.  However, since 
the team’s experts chose only 5 alternative futures as likely and useful for further study, 
and since the entire range of futures comes from the same matrix family, it could be 
argued that the remaining 11 are simply variations of the chosen 5.  Therefore, for this 
exercise, each of the 5 scenarios will be given a 1/5 chance of developing.  Using a 
similar rationale for the SPACECAST 2020, AF 2025, NIC 2020 and Army 2025 studies 
gives respective probabilities of 1/4, 1/4, 1/4 and 1/6 for each of their alternative futures. 
It should be noted that each of the studies relies on several drivers to determine 
the alternative futures.  Presumably a more detailed probability analysis could be 
constructed to address the probabilities of each individual driver.  However, since those 
drivers and their values are, by default, given equal weight by the study teams, a more in-
depth analysis would not produce more useful information—unless the goal was to adjust 
those weights.  As a result, this research will consider the alternative futures themselves 
as a sufficient level at which to assign probabilities. 
3.7. Probability of Fertile Environments for Advanced System Fielding 
Based on the assumptions made by all the alternative futures studies reviewed for 
this research, and the practical considerations adopted by the Technology Warning 
Assessment methodology, there are two key factors that play into the fielding of 
advanced weapons systems that could conceivably compromise the US Air Force 
strengths of speed, altitude and stealth: Technological capability and Economic 
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capability.  The advanced capabilities and high-speed/high-altitude operating 
environment of a global strike vehicle are not likely to be impinged by scattered Man-
Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) or indeed, any piecemeal IADs.  Instead, 
there must be a significant development effort to field advanced detection and defense 
systems.  Additionally, there must be the vast economic resources available to fund the 
development, fielding and operation of the systems. 
Each of the futures studies under review does provide insight into the likelihood 
of the proper conditions evolving to manifest credible threat systems.  To begin, the types 
of futures naturally aggregate into two general categories: State Actor dominated futures, 
and Non-State Actor dominated futures.  Neither category precludes the other, but instead 
indicates that a majority of the power falls into a certain category.  For example, the Mad 
Max Inc. alternative future of SPACECAST 2020 posits a significant decline in the 
power of the nation state as global mega-corporations evolve into powerful economic and 
political leaders in the world.  There will still be state actors, but the most significant 
power players will be the corporations that hold the capital and technical expertise.  
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Table 11 shows the State Actor/Non-State Actor break out of the alternative 
futures in each of the studies under review.   As long as several significant factors are 
taken into consideration, it may be reasonable to assume that each alternative future study 
is equally significant and that each scenario within a given study is equally weighted 
among its peers—thus allowing one to calculate the relative likelihood’s of a particular 
future’s occurrence.   To support that assumption the following should be considered.  In 
each of the studies, the authors made no overt effort to quantify the relative likelihoods of 
included scenarios.  However they did make a qualitative cut and chose to put forward 
only a subset of their total possible futures for analysis.  Since there did not appear to be 
any real constraint on the number of alternative futures each study could develop, this 
research considers the alternative futures chosen by each study to represent to total set of 
likely futures for that study.   Additionally, while at least one study (SPACECAST 2020) 
suggested a particular alternative future as the “most likely”, it did not indicate a relative 
degree of likelihood in any quantifiable way.  
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 Another issue that should be addressed is that at least two of the studies 
(SPACECAST and AF 2025) were directly influenced by the same researcher (Parnell).  
This fact would naturally detract from any calculations assuming mutual exclusivity of 
the studies (as is assumed done in this research), but there are several mitigating factors 
that make the assumption reasonable.  First, the studies were accomplished five years 
apart from each other with different goals in mind.  Second, while the same principle 
researcher (Parnell) was involved in both studies the composition of the expert panels, 
and analysis teams were certainly a different mix of people between the two studies.  
Additionally, the methodology was such that one researcher would not be able to unduly 
skew the outcome. Therefore the results can be considered effectively independent for the 
sake of this research.   
Table 12 shows the calculation of the State Actor versus Non-State Actor 
likelihoods.  The result appears to show only a slight edge to the strong state dominated 
futures.  But there is more that can be gleaned from the data. 
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State 0.5 0.25 0.6 0.5 0.67  
(x 1/5) 0.1 0.05 0.12 0.1 0.134 0.504 
Non-State 0.5 0.75 0.4 0.5 0.33  
(x 1/5) 0.1 0.15 0.08 0.1 0.066 0.496 
 
Since there is another essential element to the threat equation (i.e., technology), it 
is necessary to advance this method of inquiry further to uncover the probable scenarios 
that would produce the requisite technology environment.  In fact, since most of the 
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advanced technologies under consideration require significant scientific development and 
economic resources this research will be concerned only with those scenarios that are 
likely to produce a fertile development environment.  Table 13 indicates the alternative 
futures that are indicative of high levels of technological development (H) and those that 
are projected to have a more stunted development curve (L).  
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From this data, one can again perform a likelihood analysis for the necessary 
economic and technology conditions. Table 14 shows the calculation of the High Tech 
versus Low Tech likelihoods.  Because the methodology for the NIC 2020 study does not 
clearly indicate a consistent measure for technology or economy in its scenarios, it cannot 
be included in the mix for determining technology development. The result appears to 








Air Force      
2025 




High Tech 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.833  
(x 1/4) 0.125 0.125 0.15 0.208 0.608 
Low Tech 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.167  
(x 1/4) 0.125 0.125 0.1 0.042 0.392 
 
The relevant question then migrates to conditional likelihoods.  Given the 
prerequisite of a high-technology environment to generate and field advanced weapon 
systems, what is the likelihood of the design/fielding agent being a state actor and what is 
the likelihood of the design/fielding agent being a non state actor?  As the calculations 
below indicate, a high technology world of the future is much more likely to be a state 
actor dominated world than a non-state actor dominated world. 
P (State | High Tech) =
P (High Tech | State) * P (State)
P (High Tech)
P (High Tech) =
P (State) =
P (High Tech | State) =
0.504 








P (Non State | High Tech) =
P (High Tech | Non State) * P (Non State)
P (High Tech)
P (High Tech) =
P (Non State) =
P (High Tech | Non State) =
0.496 








Given a high likelihood of a high technology and robust economy future 
(“Technomic” in the language of AF 2025) one can then evaluate the threat scenarios in 
the context of the National Research Council’s (NRC) technology evaluations.  Since the 
NRC’s assessment study was targeted at the 2015 it is necessary to consider some 
adjustments based on the type of future being considered.  For example, in the world of 
2025-2035 there will have been an additional 10-20 years for development projects to 
progress, so it is reasonable to adjust the evaluations upward for a high “Technomic” 
future.  In the same way, a stunted future may indicate that the projections for 2015 
would be shifted into a slower development pattern—reducing the expected maturity of 
reviewed technologies.  Since this research is primarily concerned with a high 
“Technomic” future, it will graduate the existing technology maturity evaluations to the 
next highest level.  For example, if a particular technology was evaluated as “Alert” in 
the NRC study it would normally be given a “High” likelihood rating.  Instead, it will be 
given a “Very High” rating.  Similarly, technologies that that were considered but not 
originally rated at the lowest level (watch) and would have been given a “low” likelihood 
will now be considered to have a “moderate” rating.   
Given that that the high tech future is expected to manifest with a 60% probability 
and a low tech future at 40% probability, it is clear (assuming the validity of the 
calculations) that there is a fairly decent likelihood that the future will not produce the 
environment required for the development of advanced threat systems.  Taking the 
approach of only planning for the high tech future indicates a certain amount of risk-
averse thinking.  However, there are several factors that make this approach the most 
logical to take: 
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1) The data (as presented and understood) projects a significantly higher 
likelihood of a high tech future. 
2) Two of the studies used for the calculations took place before 9-11, before the 
current Iraq war, and before the resurgence of the global economy following the 
“dot com” collapse of the 1990’s.  Therefore they may not have fully appreciated 
the power of today’s state actors and the global economy. 
2) Military decision makers are not prone to take unnecessary risks with national 
security issues and matters of global power projection.   So they would likely take 
the course of covering as many bases as possible (within budget constraints). 
3) Taking a risk seeking approach in this instance would require the decision 
maker to take no action (or limited action) to mitigate projected threats—hardly a 
prudent course for the United States in today’s political environment. 
 
Through a similar line of thinking, there does not appear to be much utility in 
pursuing calculations for other conditional probabilities (e.g., Probability of Non-State 
Actors given a Low Tech future).  A solid majority (60%) of the available probability 
rests with the State Actor/High Tech futures, and the other risk-averse rationale apply as 
well.     
3.8. Evaluation of Consequences 
To evaluate consequences, the following criteria will be used.  An outcome that 
would result in the imminent destruction of the strike vehicle will be considered 
catastrophic.  An outcome that would severely impair vehicle operation but allow for 
additional operation time before destruction will be considered critical.  An outcome that 
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would significantly degrade or disables multiple flight systems or defensive systems—but 
allows continued operation will be considered serious.  An outcome that would 
significantly degrade multiple vehicle systems or disables a non-flying system, but still 
allow the vehicle to complete the mission at increased risk or abort the mission and return 
will be considered moderate.  An outcome that impacts vehicle systems (temporarily or 
permanently) but still allows mission completion with near full capability will be 
considered marginal. 
For the bi-criteria filtering phase of the Risk Filtering Ranking and Management 
(RFRM) process, this research will use the technology maturity level of the enabling 
technologies to determine the likelihood of a fielded system possessing the required 









Table 15: Evaluated Scenarios 
 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
Avionics   
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1) High Catastrophic 
S1a - Flight Avionics (EMP2) High Critical 
S2 - Navigation (EMP1)  High Moderate 
S2a - Navigation (EMP2)  High Moderate 
S3 - Navigation (Conventional)  Low Moderate 
S4 - Sensors (EMP1)  High Serious 
S4a - Sensors (EMP2)  High Serious 
S5 - Sensors (Conventional)  Moderate Serious 
S6 -  Communications (EMP1)  High Moderate 
S6a - Communications (EMP2)  Very High Moderate 
S7 - Communications (Conventional)  Moderate Moderate 
S8 - Data Links (EMP1)  High Moderate 
S8a - Data Links (EMP2)  Very High Moderate 
S9 - Data Links (Conventional)  Low Moderate 
S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)  High Critical 
S10a - Aircraft Management System (EMP2)  Very High Critical 
Propulsion   
S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)  Low Critical 
S12 - Fuel System (DEW)  Low Catastrophic 
S13 - Engine (Conventional)  High Catastrophic 
Structure   
S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)  High Critical 
S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional)   High Serious 
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Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
Defensive Systems   
S16 - Flares/Chaff Damaged (Conventional)  Moderate Serious 
S17 - Flares/Chaff/ECM Degraded (Multiseeker technology)  High Serious 
S18 - ESM/DAS degraded (smart/stealthy missiles)  High Serious 
S19 - ESM/DAS destroyed (EMP1)  High Serious 
S19a - ESM/DAS damaged (EMP2) High Critical 
S20 - Passive Stealth degraded (Conventional)  Moderate Serious 
S21 - Passive Stealth degraded (Multi-static)  High Serious 
S21a - Passive Stealth degraded (cellular networks)  High Moderate 
S22 - Passive Stealth degraded (DEW)  Low Serious 
Power   
S23 - Electrical System (EMP)  High Catastrophic 
Once all the scenarios have been identified and rated on the likelihood / 
consequences scale, they can be transcribed on to the risk matrix to evaluate their 
severity.   As shown in Table 15, the different scenarios cover the spectrum of severity 
ratings—bringing into play to next filtering step of the RFRM process.  Obviously the cut 
could be made at any point by the decision maker; who must consider the resources 
available to address each risk scenario.  However, common business practice seems to 
indicate that it is reasonable to focus the risk mitigation effort and guard against over 
commitment of limited resources.  To that end, this research will focus the remaining 
analysis on those scenarios that present either a High Risk or an Extremely High Risk as 
indicated on the severity matrix.   
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Making the cut at the High Risk level reduces the original 31 scenarios to a more 
manageable (and urgent) list of 19 scenarios (Table 16). It is still important to maintain 
the original scenarios.  This practice allows for revisiting scenarios later in the process to 
ensure modeling decisions have not created new vulnerabilities or increased the severity 




Table 17: Scenarios Bi-Criteria Cut Matrix 
 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
Avionics   
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1) High Catastrophic 
S1a - Flight Avionics (EMP2) High Critical 
S2 - Navigation (EMP1)  High Moderate 
S2a - Navigation (EMP2)  High Moderate 
S3 - Navigation (Conventional)  Low Moderate 
S4 - Sensors (EMP1)  High Serious 
S4a - Sensors (EMP2)  High Serious 
S5 - Sensors (Conventional)  Moderate Serious 
S6 -  Communications (EMP1)  High Moderate 
S6a - Communications (EMP2)  Very High Moderate 
S7 - Communications (Conventional)  Moderate Moderate 
S8 - Data Links (EMP1)  High Moderate 
S8a - Data Links (EMP2)  Very High Moderate 
S9 - Data Links (Conventional)  Low Moderate 
S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)  High Critical 
S10a - Aircraft Management System (EMP2)  Very High Critical 
Propulsion   
S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)  Low Critical 
S12 - Fuel System (DEW)  Low Catastrophic 
S13 - Engine (Conventional)  High Catastrophic 
Structure   
S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)  High Critical 
S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional)   High Serious 
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Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
Defensive Systems   
S16 - Flares/Chaff Damaged (Conventional)  Moderate Serious 
S17 - Flares/Chaff/ECM Degraded (Multiseeker technology)  High Serious 
S18 - ESM/DAS degraded (smart/stealthy missiles)  High Serious 
S19 - ESM/DAS destroyed (EMP1)  High Serious 
S19a - ESM/DAS damaged (EMP2) High Critical 
S20 - Passive Stealth degraded (Conventional)  Moderate Serious 
S21 - Passive Stealth degraded (Multi-static)  High Serious 
S21a - Passive Stealth degraded (cellular networks)  High Moderate 
S22 - Passive Stealth degraded (DEW)  Low Serious 
Power   
S23 - Electrical System (EMP)  High Catastrophic 
As stated, the process thus far has produced 19 scenarios; however, further 
filtering is necessary to focus limited resources on the problematic scenarios for 
mitigation planning and action.  Using Haimes’ 11 criteria each of the remaining 

























































Undetectability M L M L M L M L M L M L M H L L L M H M L H H M 
Uncontrollability H H M M M M H M M L M L H H H H M H H M M M M H 
Multiple Failure Paths  H H L L M M L L L L M M H H H H H M M H H M M H 
Irreversibility              H M H L H M H L H L H M H H H H H M M H M M M H 
Duration of Effects H M H L H M H L H L H M H H H H H H H H M H H H 
Cascading Effects H M L L M M L L L L M M H H H H H M M M M M M H 
OpsEnvironment M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
Wear and Tear M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M 
HW/SWHU/OR H H M M M M L L L L H H L L L L M M M M M L L H 
Complexity  H H H H H H M M M M H H H H H H H M M M M M M H 
Design Immaturity N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
                         
Total L 0 1 2 5 0 1 3 6 3 7 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Total M 3 5 5 4 7 8 4 4 5 3 6 6 3 2 2 2 4 8 7 7 8 7 7 3 
Total H 7 4 3 1 3 1 3 0 2 0 4 2 6 7 6 6 5 2 3 3 1 2 2 7 
Total of 
 L=1, M=2, H=3 
27 23 21 16 23 20 20 14 19 13 24 2  
0 
25 26 24 24 24 22 23 23 2  
0 
21 2  
1 
27 
Ideally, this process leaves the most severely mission-impacting scenarios to 
analyze and address for mitigation efforts.  However, since the RFRM process literature 
does not provide a method for culling scenarios based on the 11 criteria, it falls to the 
researcher to devise a logical selection scheme.   
One approach would be to select those scenarios with the highest occurrences of 
High impacts.  Using 6 as the threshold would produce a list of six scenarios that have the 
potential for the most extreme impact on the strike vehicle.  Another technique would be 
to assign a point value to each rating level (L=1, M=2, H=3) resulting in a maximum 
score of 30 and a minimum score of 10 (since Design Immaturity is N/A for all 
scenarios).   This technique still puts more weight on the High impact items, but also 
allows Moderate and Low risk items to be considered in the evaluation (though still in a 
qualitative way).   The number of scenarios to be retained is simply based on where the 
cut line is drawn.  At a score of 24 there are 8 scenarios, while dropping the bar to 23 
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raises the total 13.  It should be noted that each technique may exclude scenarios included 
by the other approach, so it is important to look at the complete picture—not just focus 
on the calculated numbers.  For this study, however, assigning points to each evaluation 
level ends up including all of the scenarios that would have been included in the extreme 
event approach, so this research will use the point system and draw the line at 24. Table 
19 shows the final scenarios to be analyzed for the threat mitigation plan of the decision 
maker. 
Table 19: Scenarios Multi-Criteria Cut Matrix 
 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1) High Catastrophic 
S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)  High Critical 
S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)  Low Critical 
S12 - Fuel System (DEW)  Low Catastrophic 
S13 - Engine (Conventional)  High Catastrophic 
S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)  High Critical 
S15 - Control Surfaces (Conventional)   High Serious 
S23 - Electrical System (EMP)  High Catastrophic 
 
3.9. Summary 
The RFRM methodology, when combined with the alternative futures review and 
technical assessments has allowed for the generation and qualitative down selection of 
several threat scenarios.  These scenarios, while useful in their current state, now require 
further analysis and understanding to effectively assist the decision maker in making 
development investments to counter likely threat technologies. 
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4. Scenario Analysis 
Once the number of scenarios has been filtered down to a workable group of 
threats, they must be analyzed and transformed into actionable vectors to mitigate those 
threats.   In the Risk Filtering Ranking and Management (RFRM) process, this is 
represented as a shift in the analysis from the qualitative to the quantitative—followed by 
the development of management strategies.  However, since the problem under review 
concerns imprecise predictions about the future state of the world, an attempt to rigidly 
quantify the results would be highly speculative.  Nonetheless, a qualitative analysis can 
still be performed and a management strategy is still possible to guide the design effort.  
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examining the selected scenarios and 
discussing mitigation options.  It should be noted that though the mitigation discussions 
are based on the literature in Chapter 2 (as well as additional, non-scholarly sources like 
Global Security.org and the Federation of American Scientists) they are not meant to be 
considered definitive, completely exhaustive or even an expert opinion.  Instead, they are 
meant to present a reasonable starting point and demonstrate the technique and process 
that could be used to further support and develop the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) 
design effort. 
In general, threat mitigation strategies should center on decreasing either the 
likelihood or the consequence (or both) of a particular scenario outcome.   In each 
scenario (or group of scenarios) below, the analysis will consider several, logical, open-
source options to reduce the scenario severity. 
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4.1. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Threats 
 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
S1 - Flight Avionics (EMP1)  High Catastrophic 
S10 - Aircraft Management System (EMP1)  High Critical 
S23 - Electrical System (EMP)  High Catastrophic 
In addition to the technical assessments predicting the viability of 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons, it is also useful to employ visualization by 
aerospace technology pundits to help shape the concept space.  Accordingly, and EMP 
style warhead could be employed with Air-to-Air Missiles and Surface-to-Air Missiles 
with varying platforms—possibly as envisioned below in the concepts portrayed by 
Global Security and AF 2025: 
“Providing that compact electromagnetic warheads can be built…a 
number of other potential applications become viable. One is to equip an 
Air-Air Missile (AAM) with such a warhead…Loss of…EW equipment, 
mission computers, digital engine controls, communications and 
electronic flight controls…could render the victim aircraft defenseless 
against attack with conventional missiles…Area defense SAMs…could 
accommodate an electromagnetic warhead comparable in size to a bomb 
warhead…This has obvious implications for the electromagnetic hardness 
of combat aircraft systems.” (Global Security.Org) 
“[An] airship whose purpose is to serve as a platform for an aerial mine 
system...[will]obtain operating ceilings of over 100,000 ft. and can remain 
airborne for periods exceeding one year…The airships would be 
autonomously operated via sensors and computers. It would use radar, 
infrared, or other devices to detect enemy air activity; upon which air to 
air missiles would automatically engage the enemy. A fleet of such craft 
could be used as aerial mines to make enemy airspace unusable…”(Air 
Force 2025) 
Likelihood Mitigation:  The likelihood of experiencing a negative outcome can logically 
be reduced in several ways—each promising improvement, but at a cost. 
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1) Harden critical vehicle systems against the EMP threat.  The required degree of 
hardening (i.e., EMP shielding) would depend on the anticipated intensity of the 
EMP, which is a factor of the pulse strength and the distance to the source.  In 
general, the greater the shielding capacity, the greater will be the addition to 
vehicle weight.  Increased vehicle weight will detract from vehicle performance 
(to varying degrees depending on design decisions) by reducing the maximum 
payload, reducing maximum range or degrading other flight characteristics (e.g., 
Radio Frequency (RF) stealth cross section).  
2) Add enhanced sensors to the strike vehicle to improve chances of detecting small, 
stealthy aerial mines and either avoiding their area of effect or destroying their 
operating platform.  Additional/more capable sensors will likely add to vehicle 
weight and modify the vehicle shape which presents the same concerns as above.  
If the “avoidance” tactic is chosen the vehicle will require additional range 
capability to ensure reaching the target after evasive maneuvers.  If the “destroy 
the threat” tactic is employed the addition of an air-to-air strike capability would 
have to be added to the vehicle (kinetic or directed energy) which adds to vehicle 
weight and complexity and reduces the vehicle’s strategic strike capacity. 
3) Render the enemy defensive net ineffective by avoiding detection through 
enhancement of the stealth features of the US Air Force strike vehicle.  This is a 
highly classified area of inquiry, but some general principles can be applied for 
discussion in this non-classified thesis.  First, all things being equal (geometry, 
composition, etc.) a smaller vehicle will present a smaller radar cross section (in 
all wavelengths).  Second, research could focus on increasing the effectiveness of 
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current radar absorbing material.  Finally, recent research on active stealth 
technology (microwave frequency) may indicate a fruitful area of investment for 
multi-spectral active stealth technology. 
Consequence Mitigation: The consequences of temporarily losing flight control are 
difficult to mitigate, as they would typically lead to the imminent demise of the air 
vehicle.  However, there may be some design features that would allow the air vehicle to 
default into a stable flight configuration in the event of the loss of coherent control 
signals.  While the lack of maneuverability may increase the risk of successful assault by 
other enemy weapons, it would also allow for the possibility of recovering vehicle control 
and either continuing the mission or retrieving the vehicle intact. 
4.2. Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) Threats 
 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
S12 - Fuel System (DEW)  Low Catastrophic 
While only one of the directed energy weapon scenarios made it into the final list 
for evaluation, the potentially catastrophic effects make this a likely future weapon to be 
concerned with—especially since there is no defense against the threat today.  The most 
visible scenario mirrors US Air Force efforts with the Airborne Laser (ABL) project, 
though ground-based Integrated Air Defense systems (IADs) projects are certainly 
feasible considering the greater energy reserves available for a ground based system.  The 
ABL is designed to destroy enemy missiles in the boost phase but is equally viable as an 
anti-aircraft weapon. 
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“The ABL is designed to detect and destroy theatre ballistic missiles in the 
powered boost phase of flight immediately after missile launch. The 
aircraft loiters at an altitude of 40,000 feet. Missile launch is detected by a 
reconnaissance system such as satellite or Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) aircraft and threat data is transmitted to the ABL 
aircraft by Link 16 communications. A suite of infrared, wide-field 
telescopes installed along the length of the aircraft's fuselage detects the 
missile plume at ranges up to several hundred km...Where the missile 
carries liquid fuel, the laser can heat a spot on the missile's fuel tank, 
causing an increase in internal pressure resulting in catastrophic 
failure…” (Air Force Technology.com) 
 
Likelihood Mitigation 
1) Shield the surface of the vulnerable area with a highly reflective coating.  
Unfortunately, that would also likely increase the radar cross section of the 
vehicle unless material was developed to be transparent to RF but opaque to 
visible light. 
2) Construct the fuel storage tanks to withstand very high external temperatures and 
to radiate the energy back to the environment (may increase the IR signature). 
3) Add sensors to the vehicle to detect thermal spikes and develop in-flight 
maneuvers to reduce the laser dwell time over any specific point on the vehicle.  
Consequence Mitigation 
1) Design fuel bladders to be able to release pressure without exploding (would still 
result in loss of fuel and reduced mission range) 
2) Design the strike vehicle with a favorable glide ratio (and emergency weight 
management system to drop unneeded gear) so that a high altitude mission that 
lost its fuel source could still return to neutral territory. 
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4.3. Conventional Threats 
The “conventional” threat scenarios are labeled as such because the agent of 
destruction is a simple, kinetic warhead on a standard missile (albeit with advanced 
materials, propulsion and electronics on board).  Since that is the assumed case, the 
reduction in likelihood will be similar in many respects—illuminated by the following 
visual description. 
“A broad-band multimode seeker system for a missile includes a wide 
band phased array transmitter/receiver unit incorporating a wafer scale 
phased array device with a bandwidth of about 2 GHz to 35 GHz. A 
multimode intermediate frequency unit selectively generates radar and 
jamming waveforms and measures parameters of reflected radar and 
external emissions of RF energy. A guidance processor manages the front 
end assets for selective active or semi active radar searching and tracking, 
and simultaneous searching for, tracking of, homing on, and applying a 
selection of electronic countermeasures to, multiple defensive radars. 
Confirmation of an assigned target is made through correlation of 
received RF signals with libraries of expected defensive system 
parameters and high resolution target profiles and preloaded target 
geographical coordinates.” (Freepatentsonline.com) 
 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
S11 - Fuel System (Conventional)  Low Critical 
Likelihood Mitigation 
1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile 
seeker hardware).  This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and 
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require 
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior. 
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2) Invest design dollars to reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of 
detection and weapons lock. 
3) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming 
missiles. 
4) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile 
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems. 
Consequence Mitigation 
1) Design fuel bladders to be able to release pressure without exploding.  This option 
would still result in loss of fuel which would reduce mission range, but could 
allow for strikes on secondary targets and for the recovery of the vehicle. 
2) Design the fuel system with independently controllable, redundant fuel flow 
systems.  While this option obviously adds to vehicle weight and complexity, it 
would also increase the vehicle survivability in the case of minimal vehicle 
damage. 
3) Design the strike vehicle with a favorable glide ratio (and an emergency weight 
management system to drop unneeded gear) so that a high altitude mission that 
lost its fuel source could still return to neutral territory. 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 





1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile 
seeker hardware).  This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and 
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require 
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior. 
2) Employ design concepts to further reduce the IR signature of the vehicle engine 
exhaust to decrease chances of a fatal engine impact (increased vehicle 
complexity). 
3) Invest design dollars to reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of 
detection and weapons lock. 
4) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming 
missiles. 
5) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile 
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems. 
Consequence Mitigation 
1) Design the strike vehicle with multiple engines sufficiently separated on the 
airframe to allow continued flight operations without one engine and with some 
structural damage (e.g., A-10 robust design). This would certainly add to the 
vehicle complexity, size and weight—which equate to performance tradeoffs. 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
S14 - Air Frame (Conventional)  High Critical 
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Likelihood Mitigation 
1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile 
seeker hardware).  This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and 
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require 
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior. 
2) Invest design dollars to reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of 
detection and weapons lock. 
3) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming 
missiles. 
4) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile 
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems. 
Consequence Mitigation 
1) Build in redundant structures to support the air frame (adds to vehicle weight). 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence 
S15 -  Control Surfaces (Conventional)  High Serious 
Likelihood Mitigation 
1) Install on-board, active, anti-missile system (e.g., small laser to blind missile 
seeker hardware).  This option will add extra weight (for the sensor hardware and 
the weapon itself), increase the overall system complexity and would require 
additional design to incorporate into the stealth exterior. 
2) Reduce RF and IR signatures to minimize chance of detection and weapons lock 
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3) Continue development on multi-spectrum jammers to divert the incoming 
missiles. 
4) Increase the strike vehicle operational ceiling to allow more time for hostile 
missile detection and require more energy expenditure from the threat systems. 
Consequence Mitigation
1) Design robust control surfaces to allow for basic flight maneuvering even with 
heavy damage (will likely add to vehicle weight) 
2) Design an inherently stable vehicle that requires minimal control surface input.  
While a more stable design would reduce maneuverability, this vehicle is not 
intended for air-to-air combat 
Clearly there are multiple mitigation concepts available for each scenario, and 
they all require trade offs in design decisions and technology investment.  Once all of the 
mitigation concepts have been laid out and quantified in terms of cost, schedule, and 
performance parameters it is possible to construct a decision tree that would allow the 
decision maker to focus on the most “bang-for-buck” research solutions.  
4.4. Modeling a Decision Tool 
In this research, it is clear additional technical data is required on each threat 
concept to make informed decisions.  However, it is still possible to develop a decision 
tool for this problem using reasonable ranges for specific technical values and cost 
considerations.  To demonstrate how the technique could be applied to analyze a decision 
maker’s options, this research will develop a decision model to decide whether or not to 
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invest in an onboard, anti-missile directed energy weapon (AMDEW)--since this type of 
system would be useful in countering many of the threat scenarios under consideration.   
This same process could be used for EMP hardening, adding redundant control structures, 
investing in “active stealth” research, etc. 
Since this research focused on developing threat scenarios, not counter-threat 
systems, the decision model will rely on open source information, analogy, personal 
experience of the author and transparent, reasonable logic to establish quantitative ranges 
for evaluating an AMDEW.  The values can be easily changed by decision makers to 
reflect more exact information or personal beliefs, and a sensitivity analysis will be 
performed to help determine which variables merit research toward greater accuracy.   
To begin, it is useful to select existing systems that are analogous to the concept 
system under consideration in order to model the GSV parameters.  Fortunately, a form 
of anti-missile directed energy weapon system is already in existence today.  Northrop 
Grumman’s “Nemesis” system is a directional infrared countermeasure (DIRCM) system 
currently being tested on commercial airlines in the United States.  Realizing it is 
designed specifically for shoulder-fired, IR-seeker missiles and understanding that a 
DEW system on a strike vehicle would present a host of unique challenges in 
development, procurement and maintenance, the DIRCM system still provides the closest 
analogy to establish the basic decision model. 
In developing the decision tree, it is necessary to create logical pathways that will 
include every significant decision point (see Figure 10).  In this analysis, the first point 
decides whether or not to pursue the AMDEW system.  Following the status quo route 
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(no AMDEW) then takes us to the likelihood of an IADS launch.  Considering that the 
strike vehicle would be flying a combat mission deep in enemy territory, and given that 
the GSV is detected, and given that the enemy possesses the advanced capability missile 
discussed in the threat scenario, it is likely that enemy forces would launch.  So for the 
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Figure 10: Model Decision Tree 
Given that the launch does occur, the next juncture involves the suite of 
countermeasures employed today: Flares, Chaff, and ECM of various capabilities.  These 
are exactly the types of countermeasures that would be penetrable by a multi-mode 
seeker missile with advance on-board processors as envisioned by the threat scenarios 
developed in Chapter 3.  While there are certainly multiple technical specifications that 
would go into developing probabilities of this node, it may be just as effective to give a 
credible range.  So for the base case the existing genre of countermeasures will be 
considered 30% effective in deflecting an advanced missile barrage.  By setting the min 
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at 15% and the max at 50% a good range of capability can be established (given the 
assumptions made about the threat). 
Given that the conventional countermeasures fail to divert the missile(s) the next 
node posits the likelihood of a hit.  Since failed countermeasures are effectively the same 
as no countermeasures, this hit probability assumes optimum conditions for the IADs 
missiles.  Certainly there are other factors that could be considered (e.g., weather, look 
angle, etc.) but unimpeded missiles are pretty accurate in most conditions—even today—
so the base case will be set at 0.8 to hit.  The max will range up to 1.0 with the min being 
at least a .5 chance of hitting.  It should also be noted that a “hit” does not necessarily 
indicate that the warhead physically struck the air vehicle.  It could mean shrapnel from 
the warhead, overpressure damage from the explosion, or even EMP damage (depending 
on the warhead type).  This distinction allows for multiple possibilities following a hit 
(depending on consequence mitigation), though our initial model will only consider two. 
Given that the vehicle is “hit” there are two general possibilities that this model 
will consider: 1) The vehicle is effectively destroyed, or 2) the vehicle is able to retreat 
and is recovered by friendly forces.  In either case this model assumes that a hit vehicle 
will result in mission failure.  It is certainly possible to expand the model to include a “hit 
but still mission capable” option if consequence mitigation measures are included in the 




Table 20: Decision Tree Variable Matrix 
 
Probabilities Min Base Max 
i- enemy IADS launch when AF Strike Vehicle Detected 0.75 0.90 1.00
c - countermeasures (EW, Flair, Chaff, Sensors, etc.) engage and interdict 
advanced missile 0.15 0.30 0.50
h - hit (without any CM) 0.50 0.80 1.00
t - catastrophic consequences (resulting from a hit) that lead to loss of the 
GSV  0.70 0.80 0.90
Effectiveness Min Base Max 
d - deterrence effect on enemy launch decision 0.00 0.25 0.50
a - effectiveness of AMDEW (given that missile is detected and tracked) 0.75 0.90 1.00
The next phase of the analysis requires the creation of an estimate for the cost of 
developing and fielding the AMDEW system.  This estimate will provide a measure by 
which to evaluate a trade between the competing values of cost and vehicle survivability.  
Open sources posit that it would cost about $10B to procure enough systems to outfit the 
6,500 planes (1 system per plane) of the commercial passenger (and freight) industries 
with a DIRCM-like system.  Additionally, estimates predict annual operations and 
maintenance costs of the integrated system would approach $2.5B (von Winterfeldt, 
2006, and RAND, 2005). A simple, mathematical decomposition shows that the effective 
unit cost would be in the neighborhood of $1.5M (5.8M) per aircraft with an annual, per 
unit O&M cost of approximately $385K.  R&D costs are not included in this estimate 
since it is not anticipated that the GSV program would not bear the weight of the 
development effort.  Much of the R&D is ongoing today on similar systems, any future 
system would likely have its development costs amortized over a larger family of air 
vehicles. 
 Using a number of 100 global strike vehicles (GSV) gives an estimate of $150M 
($1.5M x 100 vehicles) for system development, procurement, and deployment--and an 
estimate of $38.5M annually for fleet wide O&M of the system ($385M for the 10 year 
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vehicle life).  At first glance, these numbers may seem high (especially the O&M 
figures), but the analysis will allow for a range of values and provide a means to insert 
more accurate data as it becomes available. 
For the unit cost of the strike vehicle, the best reference systems may be the F35 
and F22 (once considered with a strike/bomber variant).  Open source estimates place the 
unit cost of the F35 at around $30M, and the unit cost of the F22 at around $100M.  
Using those ranges as the upper and lower bound, the base case for the estimated GSV 
unit cost is established at the median value of $65M. 
The crew size in modern, tactical-strike aircraft is typically one (e.g., F16, F117).  
But the crew size for a long-range, extended-duration, deep-strike aircraft is typically 
more than one (e.g., F111, B1, and B2), and it is also possible that the vehicle could be 
configured as an unmanned vehicle.  For the base case, this research assumes two crew 
members.  This consideration will become a factor when value of life is factored as part 
of the total economic equation.   
In calculating the value of a human life there is no accepted answer, and any 
discussion is invariably fraught with emotional pleas and ambiguous criteria.  However, 
considering the inherently dangerous nature of military combat operations, it is 
reasonable to approach the question from a more calculated, resource loss perspective.  
At the minimum, the military would likely consider each crew member to be worth the 
cost of his/her accession and training.  So using a figure of $2.0 million to account for the 
recruiting, training and fielding of a pilot would seem to be a reasonable minimum value.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, losing an experienced pilot (e.g., Lt Col) who has 
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20+ years of service represents a much greater investment in training and development, 
as well as a the value of experience, command potential, and (among other factors) the 
automatic survivors benefit plan payout (roughly equivalent to a $350K lump sum 
funding of an annuity for a Lt Col’s survivors).   So the high end is assumed to be $15M 
with $5 M for the base case. 
For the cost of the mission weapons load this research assumes the vehicle is 
armed with a variant of today’s Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) which is supposed to retail 
for under $40K.  The base case is assumed to be 8 SDBs ($320K) and the range up to 12 
($480K) for the max and down to 6 ($240K) for the min.    
The Value of the Mission must also be considered when calculating the impact of 
a vehicle loss.  This number is certainly difficult to pin down—especially in terms of 
defining a dollar value to compare with other cost figures.  To complicate the problem 
even more, every mission is different and the political, military and economic 
consequences may be far-reaching—especially considering that the GSV would be used 
to impart strategic level combat effects.  Assuming that decision makers would like to 
maintain at least a 95% mission success rate one could say that a DM is willing to accept 
a 5% loss rate (Obviously, this number can vary based on the risk preferences of the DM: 
risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking).  So at the very low end the value of the mission 
should at least be greater than 5% of the cost of the vehicle fleet and crew roster.  This 
research constrains the high end to some number that explicitly impacts the decision 
maker in the Air Force.  Considering that vehicle losses would likely impugn the 
reputation of the strike vehicle capabilities (e.g., F117 shot down by low tech air 
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defenses) and even the entire global strike vehicle program—it may be reasonable to use 
some portion of the entire strike vehicle program cost as the value of the mission on the 
high end.  Presumably, to precipitate a serious program impact, the vehicle failures must 
take place in operational strike vehicles fairly early in the production life.  All of the 
R&D and initial procurement costs would have already been expended but the remaining 
production run of 50% of the 100 vehicle fleet could be at stake.    So the high end 
mission value cost is the unit cost (low end estimate of $30M) of a GSV times 50 
vehicles ($1.5B).  The base case is assumed to be 50% of the max case ($750M). 
Table 21: Expected Value of Consequences Matrix 
 
Consequences Min Base Max 
VOL Value of Life (Millions) $2.00 $5.00 $15.00
FAT Fatalities given loss of vehicle 1 2 2
CGSV Cost of the GSV (Millions) $30.00 $65.00 $100.00
CPAYLOAD Cost of the Payload (Millions) $0.24 $0.32 $0.48
CAMDEW Cost of Antimissile System (Millions) $100.00 $150.00 $200.00
VOM Value of the Mission (Millions) $160.00 $750.00 $1,500.00
CREPAIRS Cost of Vehicle Repairs (Millions) $0.50 $5.00 $10.00
 
Based on the values developed and outlined in Table 21, the expected cost for 
each termination node can be calculated using the following expected cost equations:   
For a destroyed vehicle (Failed Mission): 
EC = VOL*FAT+CGSV+CPAYLOAD+CAMDEW+VOM 
For a Recovered Vehicle (Failed Mission): 
EC = CAMDEW+CREPAIRS+VOM 
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Using the probabilities and expected costs, the decision tree can be solved.   
Figure 11 shows a solved decision tree using the base case inputs.  For the base case, one 
can see that although the projected cost of the AMDEW system is $150M, the expected 
equivalent cost of employing the system ($180.7M) is significantly less than the expected 










































































Figure 11: Solved Decision Tree 
 
In order to ensure the decision maker’s choice is clear, it is necessary to perform 
sensitivity analysis on all of the factors used in the decision.  Given that the range of the 
decision inputs is appropriate, sensitivity analysis should illuminate those inputs that 
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most affect the outcome.  The complete analysis is displayed in Appendix A at the end of 
this document, but the tornado diagram (Figure 12) gives a fair overview of the effect 
each variable has on the decision.  The most significant factors are clearly the Mission 
Value, AMDEW Effectiveness, Deterrence Effect, Probability of a Hit, the effectiveness 
of Countermeasures (not AMDEW), and the Probability of an IADs launch.  All other 
factors, including the cost of the GSV, have no effect on the decision.  The individual 
sensitivity analysis for each variable (Appendix A) paints an even clearer picture, as only 
one variable (Mission Value) affects the recommended decision (Figure 13).  None of the 
other variables, when projected across the entire plausible range of values, drives the 
decision.  This is particularly interesting since the ranges for each variable were 
specifically selected to represent a conservatively wide range of values.  Based on the 
sensitivity analysis, there is really only one decision point.  If the Mission Value is more 
than $267M ($483M less than the base case) then the AMDEW should not be purchased.  
Otherwise, it appears to be a good investment. 
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Tornado Diagram for EMV
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Figure 12: Tornado Diagram 
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Figure 13: Sensitivity to Mission Value 
To illuminate the decision further, it may be useful to view a risk profile (Figure 
14) that visually displays the probability and severity for each consequence.  Because of 
the relatively high probability of extreme consequences only the most risk seeking 
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Figure 14: Consequence Probability vs. Expected Equivalent Cost 
 
 
As a final check it is useful to conduct a two-way sensitivity analysis on the two 
most influential factors – Mission Value and AMDEW effectiveness.  As expected, 
Figures 15 shows that the value of the mission is still the driving factor.  However, a 
downshift in AMDEW effectiveness can move the decision point slightly—requiring a 
higher equivalent monetary value for the mission.  The equation for the decision point is 
( )
( )
142.3 23.2  
  







If the equation above is satisfied then the AMDEW is a good investment.  
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Figure 15: Two-Way Analysis of Mission Value and AMDEW Effectiveness 
 
By choosing a technology that affects the likelihood of multiple scenarios the risk 
conscious decision maker can significantly shift the risk portfolio toward the left.  To 
examine the aggregate impact of employing an effective AMDEW system, the risk 
matrix could be modified to show the shift across several scenarios (Table 22).  While it 
may not necessarily shift the likelihood to a less severe category, it is clear (in the case of 
the AMDEW system) that movement occurs in a positive direction in 50% of the threat 
scenarios. 
By making additional adjustments in the way of consequence mitigation (e.g., 
EMP hardening), the decision maker could also potentially reduce the expected 
consequences and shift the scenario in to a less severe outcome category.  This type of 
shift analysis could be useful in helping determine which mix of likelihood/consequence 
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mitigation measures provides the most impact for the least effort—though cost is not 
explicitly displayed. 
Table 22: Modified Risk Matrix 
 
 Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Catastrophic  S12 S13new S1 S13  S23  
Critical S11new 
 
S11 S14new  S10   S14    
Serious  
 
 S15new  S15    
Moderate  
 
    
Marginal  
 
    
 
 
In a similar way, a more complex decision tree could be constructed to account 
for more than one variable.  The advantage being that the, decision maker could consider 
expected equivalent costs at the same time he is considering different mitigation 
measures.  To illustrate the concept, the consequence mitigation measure “EMP 
Hardening” can be added to the analysis.  This requires the additional variables of “EMP 
Hardening Effectiveness” and “EMP Hardening Cost.”  The effectiveness will range from 
10% to 80%, with 60% as the base case.  The cost will range from 10% of the GSV unit 
cost to 50% of the GSV cost, with 25% as the base case. 
 Figures 16 and 17 below show the likelihood mitigation measure of an AMDEW 
system being considered as well as the consequence mitigation measure of EMP 
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Hardening.  Somewhat surprisingly, the EMV calculation still favors the AMDEW-only 
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Figure 16: Multi-Criteria Decision Tree 
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Figure 17: Sensitivity to Mission Value 
4.5. Summary 
Working on “future prediction” projects is inherently a struggle with uncertainty. 
Even the most experienced planners, futurist and subject matter experts will likely 
present wide-ranging opinions on most topics of interest.  The challenge to R&D 
organizations is to bracket the future with a wide enough margin to include all plausible 
scenarios, but not so wide as to entertain ambiguity.  This analysis has demonstrated that 
relatively straight-forward techniques (Decision Trees, and Sensitivity Analysis) can be 




The purpose of this research was to help generate useful threat scenarios to aid 
decision makers in planning for the defensive systems of the Global Strike Vehicle that 
will operate through 2035.  It should be clearly noted that this research product was 
designed as an example of one process to achieve those aims.  It is not a technical report 
on advanced technologies, nor is it intended to be a definitive prediction of future 
technologies or the world geopolitical situation.  Those goals are well beyond the scope 
of this effort.  Instead this research employed credible processes (Risk Filtering Ranking 
and Management, Decision Trees, and Sensitivity Analysis) to evaluate possible 
scenarios, which were generated through a reasonable synthesis of credible, relevant 
future studies and technology assessments conducted by recognized experts and 
professionals in their fields.  Additionally, all of the reports and data used in this research 
are explicitly from open sources. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the decision 
makers for any future Air Force development project would still need to access the most 
current, detailed, classified information on threat systems available.   Such information 
could easily be used to add scenarios, modify the likelihood and consequence ratings of 
specific scenarios, adjust the cost ranges, and generally provide a greater degree of 
confidence in the final result.   Employing actual parameters of current weapon systems 
(operational-based data and cost-based data) may also allow planners to predict 
thresholds at which emerging technologies would compromise current systems.    
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5.1. Recommendations for Strike System Planners 
The RFRM method seems to be an excellent approach for exploring and 
organizing threats to Air Force assets.  While it is true that the data used in this study 
were open source and, perhaps, not detailed enough for making binding program 
decisions, it is also true that it has generated some reasonable starting points for more 
detailed exploration.  Of particular note is the concept of non-nuclear Electomagnetic 
Pulse (EMP) weapons that could derail a strike mission without relying on the precise 
targeting capabilities required by directed energy and kinetic weapons.  The potential for 
probable adversaries to reduce the effectiveness of today’s stealth technologies also 
seems highly likely.  While pinpoint tracking and targeting of stealth vehicles may not be 
realized, it may not be necessary for enemy systems to be that good.  Simple detection of 
a hostile (U.S.) air vehicle in the defender’s air space may give enough information to 
partially damage or disable the vehicle and make it vulnerable to less advanced, but still 
effective aircraft kill systems. 
At the very least, the approaches explored in this research should provide decision 
makers with a method for incorporating formal studies, Red Team exercises and 
additional research into a coherent decision structure that can be evaluated and adjusted 
over time. 
5.2. Recommendations for Future Research 
This research, while useful as a foundation (or at least as a methodology template) 
requires much greater technical granularity to enable a true quantitative analysis that 
could lead to program-level design decisions.  That level of detail will undoubtedly 
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require access to classified data and classified expert assessments to attain operational 
quality decision making.  Additional research would also be appropriate (as separate 
projects) to develop more detailed capabilities projections on each of the three major 
threat areas of EMP, Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), and Advanced Detection 
Systems.  Additional research also seems needed in the area of quantifying the value of a 
strike mission so that it can be properly considered in any risk management plan. 
5.3. Final Summary 
The goal of this research was to add to the body of knowledge.  It clearly 
demonstrated the utility of the RFRM process as a useful tool for developing risk 
scenarios.  It demonstrated that using existing studies and open source technical 
evaluations can be useful in establishing a general threat framework. And it showed how 
employing future studies in concert with technology projections in a transparent process 
can help constrain an open-ended, speculative design question to a framework of 
reasonable propositions and rational operational scenarios to help guide the systems 
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